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Much is made of the ethical duty to protect attorney-client privi1
lege. Both the ethical duty of confidentiality and the ethical duty of
2
zealous representation require attorneys to vigorously defend privileged information from attempts to compel its disclosure. The notion that there might be ethical limits to such a duty is hardly ever
considered and certainly not emphasized. For most lawyers, this emphasis on the importance of protecting privilege and lack of attention
to the ethical limits of such claims has produced a sense that there is
an unlimited ethical duty to protect privileged information from
compulsory disclosure. Indeed, many lawyers seem to think that they
are ethically obligated to give privilege the same level of protection
given to criminal defendants. Just as criminal defendants are presumed innocent until the government has proven their guilt, lawyers
often treat confidential information as privileged until the party seeking compulsory disclosure proves that it is not.
From this perspective, a claim of privilege cannot be any more
frivolous than a plea of “not guilty,” even if the documents in question have never been examined nor the relevant law of privilege researched. “Knee-jerk” claims of attorney-client privilege to any information requested are seen not as merely strategic, but as ethically
required. Such conduct is buttressed by assumptions that the adversary system provides opponents a fair opportunity to challenge claims
of privilege. Taken together, these assumptions produce “an impor-

1
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2004) (“A lawyer shall not reveal
information relating to the representation of a client . . . .”).
2
Id. M.R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (“A lawyer must . . . act . . . with zeal in advocacy upon the
client’s behalf.”).

STRASSBERGFINAL

2007]

1/15/2007 11:57:13 AM

PRIVILEGE CAN BE ABUSED

415

tant and recurring problem in civil discovery—the improper assertion
3
of a claim of privilege.”
In fact, neither the law of privilege nor the systemic realities of
privilege litigation support application of the ultra-zealous posture of
criminal defense lawyers to claims of privilege. In criminal cases, the
legal presumption of innocence provides a firm foundation for the
4
ethics of presumptively pleading a client not guilty. In contrast, the
legal burdens for proving privilege are in direct opposition to a practice of presumptively claiming privilege. In matters of evidence, the
presumption is in favor of the compulsion to reveal relevant evi5
dence, and the burden initially falls on the party claiming privilege
to show that the information in question meets the multi-factor legal
6
test for privilege. Thus, as a matter of law, it is quite possible to
7
make a frivolous claim of privilege. Furthermore, courts that encounter such claims are more than willing to impose a wide range of
8
sanctions on attorneys and/or their clients, as such frivolous claims
of privilege, even when successfully unmasked, impose unnecessary
9
litigation costs on both clients and opposing parties, and use up
10
scarce judicial resources.
3

Eureka Fin. Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 136 F.R.D. 179, 181
(E.D. Cal. 1991) (“blanket” privilege objections that delayed production by five years
sanctioned by waiver of privilege and compelling production).
4
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 & cmt. 3 (prohibiting frivolous
claims and contentions but allowing “[a] lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding . . . [to] so defend the proceedings as to require that every element of the
case be established”).
5
See United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1389 (4th Cir. 1996) (stating that
the attorney-client privilege is not “favored” because it “interferes with the ‘truth
seeking mission of the legal process’”) (citation omitted).
6
See, e.g., Von Bulow v. Von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 146 (2d Cir. 1987) (“[A] person claiming the attorney-client privilege has the burden of establishing all the essential elements thereof.”); United States v. Jones, 696 F.2d 1069, 1072 (4th Cir. 1982)
(“The burden is on the proponent of the attorney-client privilege to demonstrate its
applicability.”); United States v. Lawless, 709 F.2d 485, 487 (7th Cir. 1983); Bouschor
v. United States, 316 F.2d 451, 456 (8th Cir. 1963) (“[O]ne claiming the privilege has
the burden of establishing it.”); United States v. Bump, 605 F.2d 548, 551 (10th Cir.
1979); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 834, 843 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1997) (“When a party asserts the attorney-client privilege it is incumbent
upon that party to prove the preliminary fact that a privilege exists.”). But see EDNA
SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE 38
(4th ed. 2001) (citing California statute shifting burden to opponent of privilege).
7
See cases cited infra Part III.A–C.
8
See cases cited infra Part III.B–C.
9
See, e.g., Starlight Int’l Inc. v. Herlihy, 186 F.R.D. 626, 648 (D. Kan. 1999) (“Delay and mounting attorney’s fees can equate to prejudice.”); United States v. W. Elec.
Co., 132 F.R.D. 1, 1–2 (D.D.C. 1990) (detailing the three-year delay produced by
privilege objections to hundreds of documents that were “entirely without legal
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The systemic problem with an ultra-zealous approach to attorney-client privilege is the fact that the adversary system does not work
to fully test all claims of privilege, with the result that some, perhaps
many, frivolous claims of privilege may never be successfully un11
masked. Opposing parties do not always have the resources to litigate privilege claims document by document or communication by
12
communication. Courts do not always have the time or patience to
13
review all such claims. Indeed, opposing parties may never become
privy to the facts that would allow them to successfully challenge the
14
frivolous claims. The ultimate effect of this loss of evidence on the
results of litigation may range from inconsequential to devastating.
foundation, factual basis, or both”); Ost-West-Handel Bruno Bischoff GmbH v. M/V
Pride of Donegal, No. M8-85, 1997 WL 231126, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 1997) (describing the unnecessary costs incurred by opponent when three-quarters of documents withheld as privileged “were clearly not covered by the privilege”).
10
See, e.g., Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburg, No. CIV.A.
98-1788, 1999 WL 970341 (E.D. La. Oct. 22, 1999) (a document-by-document review
of approximately 2800 allegedly privileged documents revealed that a large percentage of the documents were easily recognizable as not privileged, including blank
pages and copies of reported cases); Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384,
398 (1990) (“Baseless filing puts the machinery of justice in motion, burdening
courts and individuals alike with needless expense and delay.”); see also Deborah L.
Rhode, Symposium, The Future of the Legal Profession: Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 665, 670–71 (1994) (noting that partisan practices such as unfounded
claims of privilege both cause litigants to incur unnecessary expense and cause the
general public to bear the costs “in the form of higher prices, tax deductions for legal expenses, and governmental subsidies for adjudicative and administrative proceedings”).
11
See Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (noting in Freedom of
Information Act case that the “lack of knowledge by the party seeking disclosure seriously distorts the traditional adversary nature of our legal system’s form of dispute
resolution”).
12
See Rhode, supra note 10, at 669–70 (noting that “[i]mbalances in representation, information, and resources” can be “exploited” by partisan practices to “obstruct the search for truth”).
13
Ronald L. Motley & Tucker S. Player, Issues in “Crime-Fraud” Practice and Procedure: The Tobacco Litigation Experience, 49 S.C. L. REV. 187, 189 n.10 (1998) (noting
that courts were reluctant to engage in the review of vast numbers of documents
claimed to be privileged by the tobacco company, forcing plaintiffs to choose small
subsets for review with little information to determine which documents to choose);
see also Jones v. Boeing Co., No. 94-1245-MLB, 1995 WL 827992 (D. Kan. Aug. 30,
1995) (stating that “[i]n camera procedures should be a rare procedure in discovery
disputes” because “such a procedure requires a great deal of a court’s time and energy”); accord Vaughn, 484 F.2d at 826 (noting that the government’s failure to meet
its burden of proof when claiming Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) exemption
for hundreds of pages of documents shifts burden to court system ill-equipped to
handle it and creates likelihood that non-exempt material will be improperly found
exempt).
14
See Eureka Fin. Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 136 F.R.D. 179, 183
(E.D. Cal. 1991) (noting that when documents are withheld as privileged, but spe-
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The early failures of the tobacco litigation are an example of the
devastating effect of overly broad claims of privilege. While the tobacco companies were successfully resisting discovery of their internal
15
documents as privileged, plaintiffs were unable to prevail. However,
once the privilege claims were examined in detail, at great expense
all around, it became obvious that many of the documents claimed to
16
be privileged failed to meet even the basic elements of privilege.
Other documents met the basic elements of privilege, but were ultimately released under the crime-fraud exception to privilege. Plaintiffs were unable to make the crime-fraud argument in the early cases
because the fraud was only revealed in the very documents that the
privilege claim prevented them from examining. Indeed, it is by no
means clear that these lawsuits would ever have succeeded if the
“privileged” documents showing the tobacco lawyers’ involvement in
the cover-up of the addictive and cancer-causing effects of cigarette
smoking had not been stolen by a disgruntled employee and pro17
vided to plaintiffs’ counsel.
If the adversary system cannot be counted upon to effectively
and consistently unmask frivolous claims of privilege, an unlimited
ethical duty to assert privilege without regard to the potential legitimacy of the claim will have the effect of distorting the justice pro18
vided by our courts. The punitive nature of sanctions imposed by
courts on some egregiously frivolous claims of privilege may not be
sufficient to offset the strategic value of successful, yet unwarranted,
nondisclosure in the vast majority of cases. Indeed, to the extent that
cific information is not provided to justify the claim, the opposing party cannot know
whether “the documents withheld under a blanket privilege objection were withheld
correctly, incorrectly, or maliciously”); Delaney, Migdail & Young, Chartered v. IRS,
826 F.2d 124, 128 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that the party seeking information
claimed to be privileged has a “natural handicap—an inability to argue intelligibly
over the applicability of exemptions when he or she lacks access to the documents”).
15
See Motley & Player, supra note 13, at 189 & n.10 (“For more than forty years,
the tobacco industry avoided the discovery of its nefarious activities by hiding behind
discovery abuse practices and ill-founded claims of privilege.”).
16
See, e.g., Minnesota v. Philip Morris Inc., No. C1-94-8565, 1998 WL 257214, at
*6 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 1998) (“Defendants and each of them claimed privilege for
documents which are clearly and inarguably not entitled to protections of privilege.”); see generally Motley & Player, supra note 13, at 189 n.10 (listing the “everincreasing string of judicial decisions finding sets of tobacco industry documents
simply not privileged in the first instance”).
17
Motley & Player, supra note 13, at 190 (describing how a “whistle-blowing paralegal at one of the tobacco industry’s law firms” finally made discovery of crucial
documents previously protected by attorney-client privilege possible).
18
See Rhode, supra note 10, at 669–70 (arguing that “partisan practices” such as
“adopting strained interpretations of the attorney-client privilege” can prevent a “fair
adversarial contest”).
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ethical duties of confidentiality and zealous representation seem to
validate strategic, but frivolous claims of privilege, one can expect
that sanctions will simply be viewed as the cost of litigation that is
both effective and ethical. Such abuse has, in turn, led some to attack
19
the scope of legal protection provided to attorney-client privilege.
However, if the ethics of privilege includes a limiting principle that
makes it clear under what circumstances claiming privilege is ethical
and under what circumstances claiming privilege is unethical, ethics
can resume and maintain its familiar role as a counterweight to stra20
tegic concerns. This Article will explore this limiting principle and
consider whether it can be incorporated into the ethical rules to provide more balanced guidance to lawyers in their use of attorney-client
privilege to resist compulsory disclosure.
This is a difficult undertaking for three rather different reasons.
First, attorney-client privilege is central to the American system of jus21
tice. Our protection of confidential client communications through
privilege is premised on the assumption that this is essential to vigor22
ous representation of clients. Changes to the ethical rules that undermine attorney-client privilege would, therefore, undermine the
very role that legal ethics seeks to define and defend. Thus, any ethical limitation on assertions of attorney-client privilege must have a
negligible effect on legitimately protected communications. This Article will show both that ethical limitations on the assertion of attorney-client privilege will not undermine the ethical duty of protecting
privileged information and that useful guidance about impermissible
claims of privilege can be provided to attorneys.
The attempt to provide specific guidance regarding frivolous
claims of privilege reveals the second difficulty in this undertaking. If
what is unethical is only the frivolous claim of privilege, is the law of
19

See ABA, TASK FORCE REPORT ON ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 2, 11 (2005),
available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/attorneyclient/materials/hod/report.pdf
(noting the “policies, practices, and procedures of governmental agencies that have
the effect of eroding the attorney-client privilege” and arguing that abuse of the
privilege “as a tactic to delay and hinder the discovery of otherwise discoverable material . . . do[es] not justify encroaching upon the protections afforded by the privilege”).
20
See id. at 11 (arguing that control of privilege abuse should occur through ethical rules and sanctions under procedural rules, rather than by limiting the legal protection provided to privilege, and suggesting that existing rules are sufficient).
21
See id. at 7–11 (“[T]he privilege is an important and necessary part of our judicial system.”).
22
See id. at 7 ( “The privilege has an important role in (i) fostering the attorneyclient relationship, (ii) encouraging client candor, (iii) enhancing voluntary legal
compliance, (v) [sic] increasing the efficiency of the justice system and (v) enhancement of constitutional rights.”).
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privilege clear about what claims of privilege are frivolous? The very
description of a claim as frivolous presumes a clear and unmistakable
lack of legal merit. We must consider what, if any, claims of privilege
so clearly lack legal merit that they should be declared to be ethically
frivolous. Where the law of attorney-client privilege is too unsettled,
inconsistent, or convoluted, it may be impossible to declare claims of
23
At the same time,
privilege frivolous and, therefore, unethical.
there may be particular areas of privilege law that are more settled
than others in which identification of ethically frivolous claims of
privilege is possible.
Finally, even where the law of privilege is clear and settled, de24
terminations of privilege are highly fact dependent. Is it possible to
make lawyers ethically responsible for evaluations of facts under the
law? This will depend on how predictable such evaluations are. An
ethical limit on privilege claims cannot be merely theoretical; rather,
it must provide meaningful specific limits on when privilege must be
asserted under the ethical duties to protect client confidentiality and
to zealously represent a client’s interests. This could take the form of
specific practical guidance to identify the kind of factual support
needed for a non-frivolous claim of privilege.
This Article takes the position that lawyers are sufficiently capable of identifying frivolous claims of privilege that they may reasonably be held ethically responsible for failing to avoid such claims. It
proposes the addition of a comment to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct which will both alert lawyers to the ethical stakes on
both sides of the attorney-client privilege and provide some specific
guidance on what makes a claim of privilege frivolous and, therefore,
25
unethical. At the same time, a comment to the Model Rules cannot
substitute for legal expertise about attorney-client privilege. What is
needed is for lawyers to both develop and use judgment about claims
of attorney-client privilege. The development of such judgment can
only be provided by training and education. Thus, it is also the case
23
See Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 578 (E.D.N.Y.
1986) (imposing minimum sanctions because “the very complexity of the law on antitrust standing makes it difficult to say with assurance that any plaintiff’s claim to have
standing is obviously frivolous”).
24
See, e.g., Glade v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. Rptr. 119, 123 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978)
(waiver of privilege is a question of fact).
25
Such a comment might serve more as a guide than as a basis for discipline, as
frivolous claims in general rarely receive disciplinary treatment. See Peter A. Joy, The
Relationship Between Civil Rule 11 and Lawyer Discipline: An Empirical Analysis Suggesting
Institutional Choices in the Regulation of Lawyers, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 765, 806–07, 814
(2004) (arguing that regulation of frivolous litigation claims has and should remain
primarily the province of judges rather than state disciplinary agencies).
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that attention to the legal and factual analysis of claims of attorneyclient privilege must be given greater emphasis in the ethical training
of lawyers in law schools and in continuing legal ethics education.
I.

THE ETHICAL STATUS OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

Legal protection of clients’ communications to their attorneys
began in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as an accommodation to the honor of gentlemen attorneys who would otherwise have
been forced to violate their oath of secrecy by being compelled to tes26
tify against their clients. The justification for the privilege, however,
eventually shifted away from protecting the honor of the attorney to
protecting the client’s ability to obtain effective representation and
27
thereby gain the full protection of the law. In the absence of such a
privilege, clients could only get legal advice by taking the chance that
their attorney might be forced to disclose secrets that would otherwise never come to light; thus legal advantage could only be obtained
28
by incurring legal disadvantage. As such a trade-off would discourage legal consultation, by the eighteenth century, courts recognized
that privileging client communications from compulsory disclosure
29
was essential to the rule of law itself. This same justification continues to guide the contemporary American jurisprudence of attorney30
client privilege.
The legal privileging of attorney-client communications provides
attorneys and clients with the ability to avoid both disclosure of such
26

PAUL R. RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES 12–13 & n.24
(2d ed. 1999) (describing the emergence of attorney-client privilege in sixteenthand seventeenth-century England).
27
Id. at 12–13 (describing how a client-centered theory arose to justify the privilege in the eighteenth century).
28
See id. at 23 n.55 (quoting Story v. Lord George Lennox, (1836) 48 Eng. Rep.
338 (Rolls) (“It has been considered so important that a man should take legal advice, and communicate with his legal advisors freely and without apprehension of
consequences hurtful to himself.”)); Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888)
(The attorney-client privilege “is founded upon the necessity, in the interest and administration of justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of the law and skilled
in its practice, which assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free
from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure.”).
29
Greenough v. Gaskell, (1883) 39 Eng. Rep. 618, 620–21, 1 (Ch.) (stating that
“the interests of justice” require lawyers, and that, without the privilege, “every one
would be thrown upon his own legal resources”).
30
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (“Its purpose is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and
thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice. The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves
public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer’s being fully
informed by the client.”).
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communications and sanctions for failing to disclose in compulsory
testimonial setting such as trials, civil discovery, and grand jury hearings. In such settings, the possible applicability of attorney-client
privilege to an attorney-client communication sought to be disclosed
will trigger the general ethical duty of lawyers to “act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in ad31
vocacy upon the client’s behalf.” Yet for purposes of this particular
ethical duty, attorney-client privilege is just one of many legal rights
or entitlements available to a client that a lawyer must protect and
advance. As such, attorney-client privilege requires no more or less
zeal than any other legal right or interest and has no special ethical
status.
The special ethical status of attorney-client privilege arises under
the ethical duty of lawyers “not [to] reveal information relating to the
32
representation.” The purpose of this ethical duty is the same as the
purpose of the evidentiary attorney-client privilege: to encourage clients “to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to em33
barrassing or legally damaging subject matter.” As some, although
not all, of the information relating to the representation will typically
be attorney-client privileged, the ethical duty of confidentiality requires that attorneys assert the privilege wherever necessary to pre34
vent the compulsory disclosure of attorney-client communications.
Because this ethical duty implicates the ability of lawyers to fulfill
their roles as client advisors and representatives, it is not merely a
duty to advance the interests of a particular client, but a meta-ethical
duty to protect the role of lawyers and the system of justice that is
35
made possible by this role. As a meta-ethical duty, confidentiality
requires extra vigilance because it is understood that the consequences of failure to protect confidentiality will be to undermine the
profession and its achievements as a whole.

31

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2004); see also MODEL CODE OF
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1983).
32
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2004).
33
Id. cmt. 2.
34
Id. cmt. 3 (noting that the duty of confidentiality encompasses attorney-client
privileged information) & cmt. 13 (A “lawyer should assert on behalf of the client all
nonfrivolous claims that . . . the information sought is protected against disclosure by
the attorney-client privilege.”).
35
See Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 863 (8th Cir. 1956) (“[T]he attorney has the duty . . . to make assertion of the privilege, not merely for the benefit
of the client, but also as a matter of professional responsibility in preventing the policy of the law from being violated.”).
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II. THE ETHICAL BASIS OF LIMITING CLAIMS OF PRIVILEGE
Given that the ethical duty of protecting attorney-client confidences is located in the foundational ethical duty of confidentiality,
and is additionally buttressed by the general duty to protect the legal
interests of each particular client, it is easy to see how placing any
kind of limit on claims of attorney-client privilege might be viewed as
outside the ethical pale. There are at least two well-established ethical duties, however, that provide a foundation for an ethical limit on
claims of attorney-client privilege: the duty to provide competent rep36
resentation to a client and the duty not to make a frivolous de37
fense.
A. Abuse of Privilege as a Violation of the Duty to Provide Competent
Representation
In considering whether the duty to provide competent representation might implicitly make some claims of attorney-client privilege
unethical, it is important to recognize that this duty is primarily client-oriented. Lack of competence is only a problem, and an ethical
failing, insofar as it results in bad results for a client. In the rare case
where a good result occurs fortuitously despite incompetence, disci38
pline is also appropriate under this rule, but it would seem to be
based on an assumption that such incompetence will inevitably produce a loss of rights for future clients even if it has not done so for
the present client. Thus, in order for this rule to provide significant
support for limits on claims of attorney-client privilege, it would have
to be the case that frivolous assertions of attorney-client privilege due
to a lack of competence would regularly turn out to be prejudicial to
the clients on whose behalf the objection is raised.
Because assertions of attorney-client privilege are actions rather
than omissions, even frivolous assertions rarely have the kind of direct negative impact upon client results that a failure to file a claim
within the statute of limitations or failure to read a contract would
36

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (“A lawyer shall provide competent
representation to a client.”); see also MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 6-1
(1983).
37
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (“A lawyer shall not bring or defend a
proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and
fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an
extension, modification or reversal of existing law.”); see also MODEL CODE OF PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-4.
38
ABA, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 3 (3d ed. 1996) (citing In re Gastineau, 857 P.2d 136 (Or. 1993) (good results do not excuse the poor
job of lawyer)).
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have. Furthermore, inasmuch as frivolous assertions of privilege often effectively serve to block possibly damaging information from either disclosure or use as evidence, they will have either a beneficial
effect or no harmful effect on the results achieved for the client. In
cases where the frivolous nature of the privilege claim is neither contested nor revealed, it is difficult to see any prejudice to the current
client or to future clients.
If, however, the claim of privilege is successfully contested by the
other side, the client will, at a minimum, incur the costs of responding to motions to compel disclosure and, if counsel digs in their
heels, may incur further costs to respond to motions for sanctions
and to appeal both the privilege ruling and the sanctions. While the
potential benefits of preventing admission of damaging evidence
might be worth incurring the litigation costs of a non-frivolous but
controversial claim of privilege, this could hardly be true when frivolous privilege claims are successfully contested. In such successful
contests, the most serious prejudice to clients of frivolous claims of
privilege will likely arise out of sanctions the courts may impose.
Sanctions for frivolous privilege claims can be imposed under a
number of different procedural rules and substantive laws, as well as
under the inherent power of the court. The purposes of such sanctions include: “(1) deterring future litigation abuse, (2) punishing
present litigation abuse, (3) compensating victims of litigation abuse,
and (4) streamlining court dockets and facilitating case manage39
ment.” Monetary damages are the most typical form of sanctions.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(4)(A) requires a court to
award the moving party the expenses, including attorney’s fees, in40
curred in making a successful motion to compel discovery. The rule
permits the court to compel such payment either from the client on
41
whose behalf the frivolous claim was made, or from the attorney ad42
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
vising this course of action.
37(b)(2) allows a court to award such attorney’s fees in addition to
39

Resolution Trust Corp. v. Williams, 162 F.R.D. 654, 660 (D. Kan. 1995).
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(4)(A). Success under this rule includes both the “voluntary” provision of discovery after the filing of the motion as well as a grant of the motion by the court. Id.
41
See, e.g., Prousi v. Cruisers Div. of KCS Int’l, Inc., No. 95-6652, 1997 WL 135692
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 1997) (ordering plaintiff to pay reasonable counsel fees and cost
in bringing the motion to compel production of a redacted fee agreement between
plaintiff and its counsel).
42
See, e.g., Jones v. Boeing Co., No. 94-1245-MLB, 1995 WL 827992 (D. Kan. Aug.
30, 1995) (ordering resisting counsel to pay opposing counsel $500 for the costs of a
successful motion to compel, where resisting counsel failed to even begin to meet his
burden of showing privilege).
40
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other sanctions upon a party’s failure to comply with an order to provide or permit discovery, so long as “the failure was [not] substantially
43
justified.” Rule 37(b)(2) also provides the court the power to require the resisting party to compensate the court for the added ex44
pense of frivolous claims of privilege.
Monetary sanctions in the
form of a per diem fine are additionally available under both the
45
court’s civil and criminal contempt powers against non-party witnesses who fail to obey court orders, including orders resisted on
frivolous claims of privilege.
Should clients be required to pay these expenses as well as their
legal expenses in resisting discovery, the clients will certainly suffer
monetary prejudice as a result of their attorneys’ frivolous claim.
However, if the court requires the attorney to pay these expenses, the
only negative monetary consequence to the client will be their own
46
expenses for resisting discovery, unless the attorney later passes to
47
the client expenses the court has assessed to counsel.
43

FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2).
Gov’t Guar. Fund of the Republic of Finland v. Hyatt Corp., 182 F.R.D. 182,
186 (D.V.I. 1998) (relying on the court’s inherent powers to impose a fine designed
to compensate the court for discovery abuse).
45
18 U.S.C.A. § 401 (2002) (“A court of the United States shall have power to
punish by fine or imprisonment, or both, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority.”); see, e.g., Better Gov’t Bureau v. McGraw, 924 F. Supp. 729, 735 (S.D. W.Va.
1996) (imposing a $250 per day fine on an attorney witness who continued to resist
disclosure on grounds of attorney-client privilege after the court ordered disclosure),
rev’d in part sub nom. In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding resisted discovery was privileged).
46
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g); 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2000) (allowing
courts to make attorneys personally liable for the costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees
incurred as a result of unreasonable and vexatious multiplication of proceedings).
The inherent power of the court to impose sanctions for bad faith behavior also allows for monetary sanctions in the form of costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees under
circumstances that could include frivolous claims of attorney-client privilege. See,
e.g., SEC v. Kimmes, No. M18-304, 1996 WL 734892, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 24, 1996)
(holding that Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and
the inherent power of the court to punish bad faith conduct could permit a court to
impose attorney’s fees on a non-party deponent who had failed to produce nonprivileged documents sought under a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 subpoena
duces tecum; court subsequently ordered documents to be produced, but found such
sanctions inappropriate in this case); McCormick-Morgan, Inc. v. Teledyne Indus.,
134 F.R.D. 275, 286 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (sanctioning an attorney under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(g) and Rule 37 for claiming privilege at a deposition after waiving
such privilege; sanctions to consist of reconvening depositions at opposing party’s
counsel’s office and requiring a $500 payment by the attorney to opposing party).
47
Courts can, and sometimes do, forbid counsel to seek reimbursement from
their client for monetary sanctions imposed against counsel personally. See Chilcutt
v. United States, 4 F.3d 1313, 1325–27, (5th Cir. 1993) (forbidding a U.S. government attorney from seeking reimbursement from the government for sanctions im44
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Non-monetary sanctions for failure to obey a motion to compel
may be imposed by the courts in civil cases under Rule 37(b)(2) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. These sanctions can reduce the
potential strategic value of asserting frivolous claims of privilege by
providing strategic advantages to the party properly seeking disclosure. These punitive advantages include: establishing facts relevant to
48
the non-disclosed information against the resisting party; estopping
the resisting party from claiming privilege as to specified categories of
49
50
documents; denying the resisting party’s discovery-related motions;
precluding the resisting party from supporting or opposing specified
51
claims or defenses or introducing specific facts into evidence; striking out portions of the pleadings of the resisting party; staying the
proceeding; dismissing all or part of the action; entering a default
52
judgment against the resisting party; and treating the failure to obey
53
the motion to compel as contempt.
While some of the lesser non-monetary sanctions do not neces54
sarily lead to a loss for the sanctioned client, such non-monetary
sanctions will ordinarily be prejudicial to the client. Similarly, when
posed against the attorney for groundlessly asserting attorney-client privilege to block
deposition answers, and also stating that private attorneys may be treated similarly).
48
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A). See, e.g., Amway Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
No. 1:98-CV-726, 2001 WL 1818698 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 3, 2001) (magistrate recommendation of an order designating as established facts sought to be proven by
documents wrongfully withheld as privileged).
49
See Minnesota v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. C1-94-8565, 1998 WL 257214, at *7 (D.
Minn. Mar. 7, 1998) (when a random review of categorized documents claimed to be
privileged revealed some documents “clearly and inarguably not entitled to protections of privilege,” such abuse of privilege warranted loss of privilege for all documents within that category).
50
SEC v. Levy, 706 F. Supp. 61, 67 (D.D.C. 1989) (denying resisting party’s motion to produce certain documents and motion to extend the time permitted for discovery).
51
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(B).
52
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(C); see generally Nat’l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey
Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639 (1976) (upholding a dismissal of the action due to failure to
timely answer interrogatories both as a penalty to the sanctioned party and as a deterrent to others who might be tempted not to comply with discovery orders in the
future).
53
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(D). Civil contempt provides the court with a broad
range of discretionary remedies, including imprisonment and punitive monetary
fines. See Better Gov’t Bureau, Inc. v. McGraw, 924 F. Supp. 729, 734–35 (S.D. W.Va.
1996), rev’d in part sub nom. In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582 (4th Cir. 1997) (choosing a per
diem fine rather than imprisonment as a contempt sanction for a non-party’s failure
to obey a court order finding no attorney-client privilege).
54
For example, defendant, Procter & Gamble, sanctioned by establishing certain
facts claimed by plaintiff as proved in Amway Corp. v. Procter & Gamble, No. C1-948565, 2001 WL 1818698 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 3, 2001), later prevailed in the case. Amway Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 346 F.3d 180, 181 (6th Cir. 2003).
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monetary sanctions are awarded, the extra expense will ordinarily be
borne by the client with no offsetting benefit. Even where no sanctions occur, the client bears the extra expense of their own attorney’s
fees and costs to resist the disclosure. Therefore, in those cases in
which frivolous claims of attorney-client privilege are unsuccessful,
there will almost always be sufficient prejudice to the client to find a
breach of the ethical duty of competence.
It may well be the case, however, that frivolous assertions of privilege are a successful tactic on the whole, helping more clients than it
hurts. If this is the case, it is difficult to place the ethical failing in
question as one of competence. Only if the tactic tends to be unsuccessful, and is more harmful than helpful to clients, might it make
sense to view frivolous assertions of attorney-client privilege as incompetence. Therefore, the ethical duty of competence may not
provide clear support for the proposition that frivolous claims of
privilege involve a breach of legal ethics.
B. Abuse of Privilege as a Violation of the Ethical Duties Not to Make
Frivolous Claims or Defenses and Fairness to the Opposing Party
Unlike the duty to provide competent representation, the duties
not to make frivolous claims and to be fair to the opposing parties are
designed to limit the advancement of client’s interests. While the
comment to Model Rule 3.1 states that an “advocate has a duty to use
55
legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the client’s cause,” the rule
itself places the emphasis on the limits of such representation: “A
lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert
an issue therein, unless there is a basis . . . for doing so that is not
56
frivolous . . . .” Model Rule 3.4 explains that the adversary system’s
focus on evidentiary competition presumes that both sides have ap57
propriate and fair access to evidence.
One clear goal of the limit on frivolous claims imposed by Model
Rule 3.1 is the protection of non-clients from the negative legal, financial, or emotional consequences that such conduct can produce.
Taking legal actions for the primary purpose of creating these nega58
tive consequences is viewed as an abuse of legal procedure. Furthermore, since “what goes around, comes around,” clients who
might have benefited from frivolous claims made by their own attor55

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 cmt. 1 (2004).
Id. M.R. 3.1.
57
Id. M.R. 3.4 cmts. 1 & 2.
58
See id. M.R. 3.1 cmt. 1 (stating that advocates have a “duty not to abuse legal
procedure”).
56
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ney can at other times suffer the negative consequences of having
such frivolous claims made against them.
It is also possible to understand the limit placed on representation by Model Rule 3.1 as a way to protect the judicial system itself,
although this goal is not clearly referenced in either Model Rule 3.1
59
or its comments. This goal tends to be most clearly articulated by
the courts themselves as one of the important justifications for imposing sanctions on both parties and lawyers who have abused the proc60
The use of scarce judicial resources by frivolous
ess in this way.
claims and defenses slows the judicial process. This, in turn, hurts
the quality of justice for both civil and criminal litigants, as justice
merely delayed for some is justice lost for others.
Delay, congestion, and gridlock in the judicial system also tarnish the reputation of this system as capable of producing just results
both in the view of the public and in the view of those who work
within the system. This can lead the public to avoid utilizing the system to assert their rights and lead attorneys to avoid utilizing the sys61
tem to vindicate the rights of their clients. The negative effects of
frivolous claims and defenses can even discourage qualified candidates from seeking judicial office, as both the frustration of wasting
time on frivolous matters and the resulting increased backlog of cases
simply makes the job less attractive. Finally, frivolous claims can lead
to legislative hostility to lawyers, legal rights, and the courts, as legislatures seek to reduce the waste of taxpayer money by immunizing
62
63
various sectors of society from suit, placing caps on damages, and
under-funding the courts.

59

If Model Rule 3.1 cannot be found to have the protection of the judicial system
as a goal, it might be possible to find this goal in Model Rule 8.4(d): “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(d). Although the
comment to the rule only specifically targets the distorting effects of prejudice or
bias on the results of legal proceedings, the negative effects of frivolous claims and
defenses on the system itself would seem to be another kind of prejudice to the system that lawyers should avoid.
60
See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Williams, 162 F.R.D. 654, 660 (D. Kan. 1995)
(noting that one purpose to be kept in mind in determining the appropriate sanction is “streamlining court dockets and facilitating case management”).
61
Lawyers may choose mediation or arbitration to resolve client disputes.
62
See, e.g., CNN.com, ‘Cheesburger Bill’ Puts Bite on Lawsuits, Oct. 20, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/10/20/cheeseburger.bill/ (noting that a bill
passed the House of Representative in 2005 banning lawsuits by obese customers
against fast food restaurants).
63
Twenty-five states now have medical malpractice non-economic damage caps,
and similar federal legislation has passed the House several times. Insurance Infor-
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The primary target of this ethical duty is the initiation of a lawsuit that has no legal basis, no factual basis, or both. Clearly, this is
the most harmful kind of frivolous action a lawyer can take, as it requires the defendant to undergo the entirely unnecessary expense,
effort, and stress of defense, and produces the most impact on the
operation, finances, and reputation of the judicial system. Frivolous
defenses to legitimate claims have a lesser, although quite significant,
effect on both litigants and the court. At best, frivolous defenses can
simply slow down and make more expensive the vindication of rights
by plaintiffs. At worst, the increased cost of litigating may require the
suit to be dropped, may produce a less favorable ruling due to lack of
resources for vigorous litigation of legitimately controversial aspects
of the case, or may simply cause a lesser settlement to be accepted.
Such increases in expense and diminishment of results for the plaintiff is paralleled in the judicial system by increased use of scarce judicial and administrative resources and a sense that the results of the
process are less “just’ than they could have been.
What is of concern in this Article, however, is not frivolous
claims and defenses, but rather frivolous objections to, or resistances
to, compulsory evidentiary processes such as civil or criminal discovery, grand jury subpoenas, and trial testimony and evidence. These
are covered both by Model Rule 3.1, as discussed above, and Model
Rule 3.4, which states:
A lawyer shall not: (a) unlawfully obstruct another party’s access
to evidence . . . . A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to . . . (d) in pretrial procedure, . . . fail to make a reasonably
diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by
64
an opposing party.

As is the case with many frivolous claims and defenses, some
frivolous evidentiary objections are revealed as frivolous and, therefore, have no legal impact. I would suggest, however, that frivolous
attorney-client privilege objections are, on the whole, much more
likely to prevail than are frivolous claims and defenses.
The possibility of a default judgment if one fails to defend
against even a frivolous action is sufficient to galvanize most defendants into enough of a response to reveal the frivolous nature of the
claim. Furthermore, even in the absence of such a defense, a claim
that is legally, rather than factually, frivolous may be so obvious to the
court that it will dismiss the action on its own motion rather than enmation Institute, http://www.iii.org/media/hottopics/insurance/medicalmal (last
visited Dec. 12, 2006).
64
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4.
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ter a default. In the case of a frivolous defense, the plaintiff is already
geared up to litigate, having initiated the action in the first place.
Since the direct consequence of failing to attack the frivolous defense
would be the loss of potential positive results, and the plaintiff already has retained counsel and invested in these potential results, the
plaintiff will, except in extreme circumstances, both have sufficient
resources to reveal the frivolous nature of the defense and choose to
use their resources to accomplish this end.
In contrast, when a frivolous objection of attorney-client privilege is made in a compulsory legal procedure seeking evidence, it is
not clear to the party seeking the evidence how important or useful
the evidence not disclosed would be to their case. Even assuming
that the party making the frivolous objection files a fully detailed
65
66
privilege log with affidavits or otherwise provides the required
67
level of detail about the withheld evidence, only the party making
the objection knows the actual content of the non-disclosed material.
A privilege log will not reveal whether the evidence withheld is the
missing smoking gun, duplicative of other useful evidence already obtained, or entirely unhelpful. As a result, the value of vigorously contesting the objection cannot be predicted. Thus, even an objection
that strikes counsel as obviously frivolous may not seem worth the effort required to challenge it.
Additionally, even though a privilege log with affidavits, or an
equivalent, is meant to provide the requesting party with enough information to allow a challenge to be made to the objection, practically speaking, it is often not so easy to clearly determine, based on
the information provided, that a particular claim of privilege is or
68
might be frivolous. This is why courts prefer in most cases to under65
To satisfy the requirements of Rule 26(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, specified information is required to be included in the log. In re Cmty. Psychiatric Ctr. Sec. Litig., No. SA CV91-533AHS(RWRX), 1993 WL 497253, at *4 (C.D.
Cal. Sept. 15, 1993) (A privilege log should at least contain: “(a) the attorney and client involved, (b) the nature of the document, (c) all persons or entities shown on
the document to have received or sent the document, (d) all persons or entities
known to have been furnished the document or informed of its substance, and (e)
the date the document was generated, prepared, or dated.”).
66
See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 02-0164 MHP (JL), 2003 WL
21212614, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2003) (“In addition to a privilege log, the party
claiming privilege should produce affidavits describing the confidential nature of the
documents.”).
67
A regular feature of many, although not all, frivolous attorney-client privilege
objections is a failure to produce any privilege log, or a sufficiently detailed privilege
log. See discussion infra Part III.B.
68
Mark Stein has described a similar phenomenon under Rule 11, which he calls
a “hidden fact-violation.” Mark Stein, Of Impure Hearts and Empty Heads: A Hierarchy of
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take in camera evaluation of withheld evidence prior to ruling against
69
a claim of attorney-client privilege. In the absence of an ability to
judge either the likelihood of success when challenging a claim of
privilege or the value of the information that might be obtained,
counsel may simply choose not to make such a challenge.
Finally, another disincentive to challenging claims of attorneyclient privilege is the fact that, in many cases, there is not just one
challenge to make. Depending on the volume of information requested and available, objections on the basis of privilege could cover
tens, hundreds, or thousands of documents, each of which must be
separately challenged as “not privileged.” Even where a detailed
privilege log makes it facially apparent that no privilege can legitimately be asserted, the time and expense of evaluating and responding to each of many individual privilege claims, any and all of which
may be of little ultimate value, can and does lead requesting parties
to leave claims of attorney-client privilege unchallenged. Thus, when
considering the consequences to non-client parties and the judicial
system of frivolous objections of privilege, the consequences that occur both when such frivolous objections are successfully stricken and
when no challenge is made at all, must be included.
The obvious consequence of successful challenges on both nonclients and the judicial system is the waste of legal and judicial resources required to judge the objection frivolous. The proliferation
of magistrates as essential adjudicators of discovery disputes, some
portion of which revolve around objections based on attorney-client
privilege, and the sometimes staggering quantity of objections which

Rule 11 Violations, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 393, 395 (1991). This is where a claim violates Rule 11, under language since changed by the 1993 amendments, because it is
not well-grounded in fact and the contrary facts are either hidden from, or not accessible to, the other party. Id. Those claims of attorney-client privilege that require
access to the privileged material to reveal the lack of actual privilege would seem to
be a kind of hidden fact-violation. Stein has argued that such hidden fact-violations
“pose[] a far greater threat to the non-violator—and to justice—than the obvious
fact-violation,” for which the opposing party has access to the contradictory facts and
therefore has the ability to challenge. Id. at 397.
69
See, e.g., Lane v. Sharp Packaging Sys., Inc., 640 N.W.2d 788, (Wis. 2002) (holding erroneous a release of documents claimed to be privileged without in camera review, but based only upon a prima facie showing of the crime-fraud exception); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Fuller Co., No. 86-0151, 1986 WL 12424, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 31,
1986) (“Where, however, the parties have been unable to solve their dispute over
claims of privilege, and especially where public policy requires protection of documents or portions of documents, court inspection is unavoidable.”); Avery Dennison
Corp. v. Four Pillars, 190 F.R.D. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1999) (conducting an in camera review
despite the lack of a privilege log, but noting that failure to produce such a log can
be treated as a waiver of privilege).
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must be reviewed item by item both by the requesting litigators and
by the court in camera, along with the immediate appealability of or70
ders compelling disclosure, suggest that the financial cost to nonclient parties and the judicial system may well be considerable. While
it is impossible to quantify the extent to which the early diversion of
legal resources affects the results ultimately obtained by diminishing
the legal resources later available to devote to winning the case or
maximizing the award, it seems likely that, for some requesting parties, even successfully unmasked frivolous claims of privilege will
negatively impact the quality of justice received. For courts, the
amount of judicial time that may be expended in disputes about
frivolous privilege claims, including conferences, hearings, in camera
review, and written orders, might be almost as much as that used by
frivolous suits or defenses. Even if less time is involved, resolving
frivolous claims of privilege must be seen as adding to those delays
and backlogs that diminish the quality of justice produced and tarnish the system’s reputation for producing just results.
So far, this Article has considered the possible negative consequences that occur even when frivolous claims of privilege are successfully challenged. What are the consequences to non-client parties
and the judicial system of the considerable number of frivolous
claims of privilege that are never challenged or are never successfully
71
challenged? Certainly no time, money, or scarce judicial resources
are wasted by such claims because the issue never receives legal or judicial attention. In these cases, the frivolous claim of privilege has
successfully prevented relevant evidence from being discovered and
offered into evidence; thus the negative impact is entirely on the results achieved. The law itself is clear about the importance of admission of relevant evidence to the truth-seeking goal of the judicial
process: “[b]ecause of the privilege’s adverse effect on the full disclo72
sure of the truth, it must be narrowly construed.” If a liberal interpretation of attorney-client privilege cannot be permitted because it
has too great an impact on full disclosure of the truth, frivolous asser-

70
See Avery Dennison Corp., 190 F.R.D. at 4 n.5 (“Courts have been reluctant . . . to
conduct in camera inspection,” especially “[w]here the examination of the requested
documents requires herculean labors because of their volume.”).
71
The reluctance of courts to do in camera review, particularly when the number
of items to be reviewed is large, may lead courts to discourage full bore litigation of
privilege objections, even when the parties involved may be willing to expend the
time and resources. Thus, even frivolous claims of privilege may survive attempts to
challenge by the requesting party.
72
In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d 672, 675 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (citation omitted).
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tions of privilege that successfully prevent disclosure must have an intolerable impact on the truth that emerges from the judicial process.
This in turn produces injustice for the individuals involved and diminishes the social value of the judicial system in general.
It appears, therefore, that frivolous assertions of attorney-client
privilege, whether successfully unmasked or never challenged, unacceptably harm opposing parties, the judicial system itself, and all
those who will seek or need to seek vindication of their rights in the
future. Since the goal of these ethical duties is to prevent negative
impacts on non-clients and the judicial system in the name of client
service, Model Rule 3.1 and Model Rule 3.4 must include a duty to
avoid frivolous assertions of attorney-client privilege, should it be possible to describe some claims of attorney-client privilege as frivolous.
It remains to be seen, however, whether there are claims of attorneyclient privilege that can be reasonably recognized as frivolous without
the benefit of the adversary process. The possibility of early recognition is essential if the ethical rule is to be understood as prohibiting
the unlimited interposition of attorney-client privilege as an objection
to an otherwise legally compelled disclosure obligation.
III. ETHICALLY IMPERMISSIBLE CLAIMS OF
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
As a general matter, it is possible to identify three kinds of conduct that we might be willing to view as producing ethically impermissible claims of attorney-client privilege, each of which may be
viewed as frivolous in a different way. First, we should consider
whether claims of attorney-client privilege made for improper purposes should be viewed as ethically impermissible. Such claims may
be described as frivolously motivated because they are motivated by
interests other than the assertion or defense of legal rights.
A second kind of impermissible conduct might be best described
as “lazy” claims of privilege. This would include claims of privilege
made without reasonable factual investigation, such as failure to actually review a document before claiming it as privileged. It would also
include claims of privilege made without reasonable legal research or
analysis, as well as claims of privilege made without complying with
the procedural requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(5), such as a general objection of privilege without submission
73
of a privilege log. Claims made in these three ways might be de-

73

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5).
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scribed as made in a frivolous manner without regard for the need
for substantive support.
The final kind of impermissible conduct would involve substantively frivolous claims of privilege. Claims that are simply factually insufficient under settled law and claims that are inconsistent with existing law when no good faith argument is made to change the law
would be included here, even if such claims were not made in a frivolous manner.
In considering whether any of these kinds of privilege claims
should be ethically impermissible, a few sources of guidance are
available. First, Model Rule 3.1 and its comments provide some definitional assistance. Second, we can examine the disciplinary cases
applying Model Rule 3.1 and its predecessors. An additional resource
would be the considerable body of case law applying those statutes
that authorize the imposition of legal sanctions for litigation conduct
that could include frivolous claims of attorney-client privilege. It is
important to recognize, however, that although the language of the
law may sometimes be identical or nearly identical to the language of
the ethical rules, it is not necessarily the case that the legal meaning
of frivolous and the ethical meaning of frivolous should be the same
in the context of privilege. The law may require attorney-client privilege to be narrowly construed to minimize its distorting effect on the
74
truth-seeking function of the judicial process; however, our willingness to view a claim of attorney-client privilege as ethically impermissible is likely to be tempered by the countervailing ethical value of
confidentiality. Therefore, we may choose to define sanctionable
conduct more narrowly in the context of ethical limits on claims of
attorney-client privilege than we might in other contexts.
A. Claims of Privileges Made for Frivolous Purposes
Most claims made for frivolous purposes are at the same time
75
substantively frivolous. The opposite is surely true as well; most substantively non-frivolous claims are made for legitimate purposes. Yet
some substantively non-frivolous claims are made for improper or
frivolous purposes. Although it is difficult to imagine how typical improper collateral benefits or detriments, such as beneficial delay in
76
another matter or reputational or financial injury to the opponent,

75

Stein, supra note 68, at 402.
E.g., In re Perez, 43 B.R. 530 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1984) (attorney three times filed
and dismissed Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings to obtain multiple automatic stays
76
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might attach to frivolous claims of attorney-client privilege, let us
suppose that this can and does occur. Would we be willing to view as
ethically impermissible claims of privilege that are not entirely
groundless from a legal perspective, but which are made for such improper purposes?
From at least 1908 through 2002, American Bar Association
(“ABA”) ethical canons, codes, or rules have stated that claims or defenses made for improper purposes are ethically impermissible. The
ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, propounded by the ABA from
1908 through 1969, required a lawyer to “decline to conduct a civil
cause or to make a defense when convinced that it is intended merely
to harass or to injure the opposite party or to work oppression or
77
wrong.” In 1969, the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility replaced the Canons and stated that “a lawyer shall not: [f]ile a
suit, [or] assert a position . . . on behalf of his client when he knows
or when it is obvious that such action would serve merely to harass or
78
maliciously injure another.” In 1983, the ABA replaced the Model
Code with the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Before the 2002
amendments to the Model Rules, comment 2 to Model Rule 3.1
stated that an action would be frivolous, and therefore prohibited
under Model Rule 3.1, “if the client desires to have the action taken
primarily for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring a per79
son.” As variously drafted, these ethical rules seem to suggest that
improper purpose alone could be sufficient to make a litigation position ethically impermissible.
Not surprisingly, the issue of improper purpose as an independent ground has hardly ever arisen in most jurisdictions that have
adopted the language of either Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(1) or
Model Rule 3.1 because improper purpose and lack of merit are usu80
ally both present. At least one jurisdiction, however, has expressly
of foreclosure proceedings despite the fact that the debtors had no income and no
ability to make payments as required by Chapter 13).
77
CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 30 (as amended through 1969)
78
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A) (as amended through
1983).
79
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 cmt. 2 (2001).
80
See, e.g., In re Edmonds, No. 00-022-1227, 2002 WL 32396986 (Va. State Bar Disciplinary Bd. May 15, 2002) (suspending the license of a former judge who filed a
federal case seeking $50 million in damages from former judicial colleagues and
court staff who had participated in a judicial ethics inquiry on the ground that the
suit was legally baseless and intended to harass); see generally ANNOTATED MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (3d ed. 1996), supra note 38, at 299–300 (listing
cases from many jurisdictions in which either improper motives or substantively frivolous claims could be found).
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interpreted this language as making improper purpose an independ81
ent ground for discipline. In a few other jurisdictions, no express
position has been taken on the independence of improper purpose
as a ground for ethical sanction, but disciplinary sanctions have been
82
imposed even in the absence of findings of lack of merit.
Some jurisdictions, however, have modified their ethical codes
or rules to make clear that lack of merit is also necessary before an
improper purpose would make an action ethically impermissible.
The 2002 amendments to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
follow this trend and have eliminated the improper purpose lan83
guage altogether from the comments following Model Rule 3.1.
This reflects yet another step in the “objectification” of Model Rule
3.1 by elimination of subjective elements such as motive or knowl84
edge. This Model Rules deletion must be understood to limit the
ethical prohibition solely to claims lacking any merit from an objective perspective, with no regard to proper or improper purposes.
Under the kind of ethical regime proposed by this latest version of
Model Rule 3.1, therefore, a non-frivolous assertion of attorney-client
privilege made for an improper purpose would clearly be ethically

81

See, e.g., In re Levine, 847 P.2d 1093, 1100 (Ariz. 1993) (interpreting the language of Model Rule 3.1 to mean that “if an improper motive or a bad faith argument exists, respondent will not escape ethical responsibility for bringing a legal
claim that may otherwise meet the objective test of a nonfrivolous claim”).
82
See, e.g., In re Spallina, No. BD-99-001, 1999 WL 33721626, at *13 (Mass. State
Bar. Disciplinary Bd. Jan. 11, 1999) (imposing discipline based on, among other unethical conduct, filing a suit to attach and collect legitimate attorney’s fees for representation of husband in a divorce case from a certificate of deposit, thereby knowingly trying to frustrate the award of the certificate of deposit to wife in the divorce
action); Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Finneran, 687 N.E.2d 405 (Ohio 1997) (sanctioning
lawyer for, in a number of separate matters, filing cases, failing to provide discovery,
dismissing the cases, and then re-filing the cases, up to as many as five times, in order
to get a favorable settlement offer in the case, and describing this as a violation of
OHIO CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(1), but not citing OHIO CODE OF
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(2) (lack of merit) or describing the cases as
groundless or unsubstantiated).
83
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 cmt. 2 (as amended through 2002).
84
See ABA REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES No. 401 (Aug. 2001); ABA Center
for Professional Responsibility, Model Rule 3.1 Reporter’s Explanation of Changes,
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k/e2k-rule31rem.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2006)
(explaining the deletion as justified because “the client’s purpose is not relevant to
the objective merits of the client’s claim”); ABA, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 316 (5th ed. 2003) (explaining the change from Model Code
7-102(A)(2) to Model Rule 3.1 as a move from a subjective standard which prohibited only “knowingly advanc[ing]” unwarranted claims or defenses to an “objective
‘reasonable lawyer’ standard”).
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85

permissible. Thus, there is disagreement among ethical authorities
and jurisdictions concerning the general issue of whether improper
purposes are sufficient to make a claim ethically impermissible.
A similar disagreement can be found in the interpretation of
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11 and 26, which are the federal
procedural counterparts to Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(1) and Model
Rule 3.1. The federal rules and the case law generated by them have
86
had an important influence on the Model Rules, state procedural
87
law, and state ethical standards regarding frivolous litigation con88
duct. As the issue of attorney-client privilege mostly arises in the
context of discovery, the most relevant rule to the issue of claims of
attorney-client privilege would be Rule 26(g); however, most of the
case law on the independence of improper purpose as a ground for
sanctions has arisen in the context of Rule 11. Since most courts
89
treat Rule 11 and Rule 26(g) as parallel provisions, the Rule 11 case
90
law should be instructive as to Rule 26(g) sanctions as well.
Rule 26 states that the required signature of attorneys to discovery requests, responses, and objections:
85
See e.g., D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 cmt. 2 (2006) (deleting the purpose language found in comment 2 to the Model Rule altogether), available at
http://www2.law.cornell.edu/cgi-bin/foliocgi.exe/dcnarr/query=[jump!3A!273!2E1!3A100!27]/doc/{@1860}? (last visited Dec. 12, 2006).
California has not eliminated improper purpose as ethically impermissible, but has
required a lack of merit as well. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-200 (1989)
(precluding California lawyers from accepting or continuing employment if he
“knows or should know” that the object of employment is either “to bring an action,
conduct a defense, assert a position . . . or take an appeal without probable cause and
for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring any person”), available at
http://www2.law.cornell.edu/cgi-bin/foliocgi.exe/canarr/query=[jump!3A!273!2E1!3A100!27]/doc/{@2258}? (last visited Dec. 12, 2006).
86
ABA, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT, 1982–1998 164 (1999) [hereinafter “LEGISLATIVE HISTORY”] (noting
that the objective standard of Model Rule 3.1 “was adopted rather than one based on
the concepts ‘harass’ or ‘maliciously injure’ to track the standard generally used and
defined in the law of procedure”)..
87
GEORGENE M. VAIRO, RULE ELEVEN SANCTIONS: CASE LAW PERSPECTIVES AND
PREVENTATIVE MEASURES 40 (3d ed. 2004) (“Most states have adopted a sanctions tool
like Rule 11.”).
88
See, e.g., In re Levine, 847 P.2d 1093, 1100 (Ariz. 1993) (analyzing the treatment
of motive in the context of civil sanctions as relevant to the interpretation of ethical
frivolous standards and concluding that there was “a common theme in both our
procedural and ethical rules”).
89
See e.g., In re Byrd, Inc., 927 F.2d 1135, 1137 (10th Cir. 1991) (noting the intentionally parallel structures of Rule 11 and 26(g)).
90
See generally VAIRO, supra note 87, at 744–45 (suggesting that much of the Rule
11 analysis is relevant to Rule 26(g), with certain exceptions not relevant to this
analysis, such as mandatory or discretionary sanctions, who may be sanctioned, and
the nature of sanctions).
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Constitutes a certification that . . . the request, response, or objection is:
(A) consistent with these rules and warranted by existing law
or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law; and
(B) not interposed for any improper purpose . . . ; and
(C) not unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expen91
sive.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(g)(3) allows sanctions when such
certifying signatures are made “without substantial justification . . . in
92
violation of the rule.” As drafted, it would seem that an improper
certification as to either Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(g)(2)(A),
(B), or (C) would be sufficient to violate Rule 26(g)(2).
93
Similarly, Rule 11 states that presentation to the court of “a
94
pleading, written motion or other paper” is at the same time certification that, among other things, “to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable
under the circumstances . . . it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
95
needless increase in the cost of litigation.”
Improper purpose is
found under Rule 11(b) when a party takes an action “not in order to
prevail on the paper filed, but in order to obtain some other, unjusti96
fied benefit.” Usually, it is clear that the party does not seek to prevail because the claim is also obviously frivolous and the party knows
97
that it will not benefit directly from this legal action.
Despite clear language in both rules that an improper purpose
makes even substantively non-frivolous claims impermissible, the issue of whether courts may in fact impose sanctions for improper
purpose alone has been particularly difficult for courts to accept in
the context of Rule 11. Many circuits have refused to find sanctions
appropriate under Rule 11 for colorable complaints in which both
proper purposes of vindicating legal rights and improper purposes
98
may be combined. At the same time, most circuits have approved
91

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(2) (emphasis added).
Id. 26(g)(3).
93
Presenting includes “signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating.” FED. R.
CIV. P. 11(b).
95
Id.
96
Stein, supra note 68, at 404.
97
Id. at 402.
98
See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t Employees v. Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Employees, 844
F.2d 216, 223 (5th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he Rule 11 injunction against harassment does
not exact of those who file pleadings an undiluted desire for just deserts.”); Sussman
92
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sanctions for even well-grounded motions or other non-complaint filings
99
that are abusive or seen as serving an improper purpose. Since almost all claims of attorney-client privilege are defensive, it would be
rare that such claims would be part of a complaint. As a result, claims
of attorney-client privilege would seem to fall within the scope of
those litigation actions that many courts would view as sanctionable
under Rules 11 or 26(g). There is, however, a dearth of case law considering the actual application of sanctions under either of these
rules to colorable claims of attorney-client privilege made for improper purposes.
Although there is legal support, and ninety-four years of ethical
support, for generally imposing disciplinary sanctions on even nonfrivolous motions, filings, and discovery actions, we must now consider whether it would make ethical sense to specifically impose disciplinary sanctions on non-frivolous claims of attorney-client privilege
for improper purposes. Once the issue is limited to claims of attorney-client privilege, it quickly becomes apparent that colorable claims
of privilege cannot be sufficiently tainted by improper purposes to
justify the chilling effect disciplinary sanctions would provide.

v. Bank of Israel, 56 F.3d 450 (2d Cir. 1995) (sanctions could not be imposed under
Rule 11 for the filing of a complaint that was not substantively frivolous but was dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds and won for the plaintiff an assurance of
safe passage in Israel to testify in a parallel action filed against him there); Zaldivar v.
City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 832 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that the vindication
of rights at issue in a complaint that is well grounded in fact and law cannot be
tainted by any additional improper purposes). But see Senese v. Chicago Area I.B. of
T. Pension Fund, 237 F.3d 819, 826 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating that “Rule 11 may be violated when, even if the claims are well based in fact and law, parties or their attorneys
bring the action for an improper purpose” but deferring to the trial court’s finding
that an improper purpose was not present in this case); In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505,
518 (4th Cir. 1990) (noting that a complaint filed to vindicate rights in court, and
also for some improper purpose, should not be sanctioned so long as the added purpose is not undertaken in bad faith and is not so excessive as to eliminate a proper
purpose).
99
See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Alla Med., 855 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that
non-frivolous motions filed to harass or delay as a part of abusive litigation tactics
could be sanctioned under the improper purpose clause of Rule 11 alone, even
though a non-frivolous complaint filed for an improper purpose could not be sanctioned under Rule 11); Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 518 (stating that filing well-grounded
motions can be sanctioned as harassment if excessive or filed without a sincere intent
to pursue); Whitehead v. Food Max, Inc, 332 F.3d 796, 805 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding
an objectively ascertainable improper purpose sufficient to justify Rule 11 sanctions
even when an action is “well grounded in fact and law”); Pathe Computer Control
Sys. Corp. v. Kinmont Indus., 955 F.2d 94, 97 (1st. Cir. 1992) (affirming sanctions for
removal motion that could not be said to be legally unwarranted, but which was filed
for the improper purpose of delay).
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To begin with, attorney-client privilege claims are purely defensive in nature, unlike maliciously made, but legally grounded, offensive acts such as filing a lawsuit or making a discovery request. As a
result, the possible improper purposes that might be associated with a
claim of privilege are likely to be considerably tamer than those that
might be associated with the initiation of a lawsuit or even a request
for discovery. Imagine an attorney served with a request for documents that clearly targets some that are unquestionably privileged,
but that contain nothing that would help the requesting party. It is
difficult to see how an objection of attorney-client privilege alone
could serve the usual malicious improper purposes such as ruining a
100
101
personal or financial reputation, tying up the sale of property, or
102
causing deep emotional distress. At most, we might have a situation
where blocking the discovery of the documents might be made with
the purpose or intent of annoying and frustrating the other side or
triggering an expensive fight about the documents that will drain the
opponent’s resources and resolve. These purposes clearly fall short
of the more malicious purposes that have been seen as sufficient to
overcome the non-frivolous nature of the claims.
In addition to the fact that the improper purposes that might
motivate non-frivolous claims of privilege are more strategic than malicious, it is also important to realize that in many cases, there is a very
important legal reason why non-frivolous claims of privilege should
be asserted regardless of the lack of harm to the client if the requested communication was provided. Failure to assert privilege can
create a waiver of privilege for other communications on the same
103
subject that could be disadvantageous to the client. In cases where
such a waiver would harm the client, the proper purpose makes any
improper purpose collateral at most.
Perhaps there are cases where a waiver is either not possible or
not harmful to a client. Is there still a proper purpose sufficient to
100
E.g., Whitehead, 332 F.3d at 801 (sanctioning an attorney’s staged for-television
execution of a writ of judgment at a local Kmart for a $3.4 million judgment as undertaken both to embarrass Kmart and create free publicity for the lawyer); In re
Edmonds, No. 00-022-1227, 2002 WL 32396986 (Va. State Bar Disciplinary Bd. May
15, 2002) (finding an improper purpose where a former judge instituted a federal
racial discrimination suit against a sitting judge who had ruled against his client in a
commercial matter).
101
In re Perez, 43 B.R. 530 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1984) (filing repeated Chapter 13
bankruptcy petitions to obtain repeated stays of foreclosure).
102
E.g., Argentieri v. Fisher Landscapes, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 55, 62 n.9 (D. Mass.
1998) (party claimed a motion for attachment was filed solely to give plaintiff’s wife
“apoplexy”).
103
EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 299, 378.
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outweigh the concerns we have about these strategic but improper
purposes? Legally successful claims of privilege defend the attorneyclient relationship and the adversarial system of justice that depends
on this relationship. It seems obvious that the ethical duty of confidentiality requires protection of the attorney-client relationship by
non-disclosure whenever and wherever the relationship is actually
targeted. This defense is so important from an ethical perspective
that it is unimaginable that an improper purpose for making this defense would change our valuation of the defense. When it comes to
legally supportable assertions of attorney-client privilege asserted for
improper purposes, it may be fair to say that they do resemble notguilty pleas in criminal defense cases. Just as we cannot imagine a
collateral reason for pleading not guilty that would undermine the
defense of liberty embodied in all such pleas, we cannot also imagine
a collateral reason for denying access to possibly attorney-client privileged materials that would undermine the defense of the adversary
system provided by protecting attorney-client privilege. Consequently, any ethical limitation on assertions of attorney-client privilege should not extend to legitimate assertions made for improper
purposes. Therefore, in the context of claims of attorney-client privilege, the move made by the 2002 amendments to Model Rule 3.1 to
eliminate improper purpose as a species of frivolousness can be seen
as consistent with the underlying principles of legal ethics. Therefore, this Article would not define a frivolous claim of attorney-client
privilege as including a claim made for an improper purpose.
B. Claims of Privilege Made in a Frivolous Manner
The introduction to this section described three kinds of “lazy”
claims of privilege: claims made without reasonable factual investigation, claims made without reasonable legal research or analysis, and
claims made without complying with the procedural requirements of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5). When such laziness produces substantively frivolous claims of privilege, the lack of merit
104
alone may well suffice to make such claims ethically impermissible.
At issue in this section is whether making claims of privilege in a
frivolous manner should be an ethical violation even when the claim
turns out to be either colorable or meritorious.

104

See infra section III.C.
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Lack of Factual Inquiry

The most extreme example of a claim made in a factually frivolous manner would arise if a lawyer claimed attorney-client privilege
for documents that the lawyer had no prior factual knowledge of
without ever reviewing the documents for the presence or absence of
105
facts that would support a claim of privilege.
The ethical duty of competence under Model Rule 1.1 requires
that “[a] lawyer. . . provide . . . [the] preparation reasonably neces106
sary for the representation.”
Such preparation includes “inquiry
107
into and analysis of the factual . . . elements of the problem.” Thus,
lawyers have been disciplined for failing to obtain and review bank
records that would have prevented a conservatorship from being un108
necessarily imposed on an elderly client, for failing to obtain and
109
review medical reports in a murder case, for failing to read a cli-

105

See, e.g., Am. Med. Sys. v. Nat’l Union Fire Insur. Co., No. CIV.A 98-1788, 1999
WL 970341, at *10 (E.D. La. Oct. 22, 1999) (awarding attorney’s fees for a “completely inappropriate” claim of privilege, including for copies of folder labels, blank
pieces of paper, and copies of reported cases); see also Eureka Fin. Corp. v. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co., 136 F.R.D. 179, 183 n.9 (E.D. Cal. 1991) (suggesting that
improper “blanket” claims of privilege are most often made by counsel “who have
not carefully reviewed the pertinent documents for privilege”).
106
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2004). This language is quite similar
to Disciplinary Rule 6-101(A)(2) of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility,
which requires a lawyer not to “[h]andle a legal matter without preparation adequate
in the circumstances.” MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101 (1983).
107
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 5. It is worth noting that the
Model Code fails to mention factual inquiry in either the Disciplinary Rules or the
Ethical Considerations that precede the rule. An increasing emphasis on factual investigation can be most clearly seen in the movement from Disciplinary Rule 7102(A) to Model Rule 3.1 and in the most recent amendments to Model Rule 3.1.
See infra text accompanying notes 119–30. Further support for a general duty to undertake a factual review of documents prior to claiming privilege can also be found
in Model Rule 3.4, which prohibits a lawyer from “fail[ing] to make a reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing party.”
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4. Clearly, the first step in a reasonably diligent effort to comply would be a factual review of documents that might be within
the scope of the request.
108
In re Brantley, 920 P.2d 433, 441–42 (Kan. 1996) (before filing for conservatorship for elderly client, lawyer failed to verify that client did not know of bank transfers to son reported by bank official by checking bank records and showing client
these records).
109
In re Chambers, 642 P.2d 286, 291 (Or. 1982) (lawyer suspended for, among
other things, not reviewing state-held medical records in a murder case); Attorney
Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Mooney, 753 A.2d 17, 37 (Md. 1999) (lawyer suspended
for, among other things, failing to obtain medical records or subpoena witnesses in
an assault case).
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110

ent’s statement or contact potential witnesses, and for failing to
111
Underread grand jury transcripts or examine physical evidence.
standably, these disciplinary cases under Model Rule 1.1 have tended
to involve failures to investigate facts central to the success and failure
of the claims and defenses of clients. Indeed, Model Rule 1.1 would
seem to be aimed at failures to factually investigate that are likely to
directly lead to loss of client rights. Thus, in such cases, courts are
willing to say that good results, should they occur, do not excuse the
lack of preparation on the part of the lawyer because the good results
are not really produced by the representation itself, but by some in112
dependent factor.
On the other hand, it is difficult to say that incompetence is present when the acts or omissions may and do directly produce good
113
results, and can therefore be seen as strategic acts or omissions.
Clearly, if a lawyer fails to examine documents to be produced, produces them all without claiming privilege for any of them, and
thereby produces some privileged documents, we would have a
Model Rule 1.1 failure to factually investigate that directly led to a
loss of client rights. Indeed, there would probably be a greater degree of competence at work if the same lawyer were to blindly claim
privilege for all the documents in this situation, rather than failing to
make any effort at all to protect the client’s privilege. In this situation, if privileged documents are thereby protected, the lawyer has
directly produced this result. If detrimental information has been
withheld from the opposing party, the lawyer has directly produced
this result as well. There is a level of legal and strategic competence
operating in such a practice that makes it difficult to bring it cleanly
within the scope of cases decided under Model Rule 1.1.

110

Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Ficker, 706 A.2d 1045, 1057–58 (Md.
1998) (lawyer appeared not to have read statement given by client to assistant and
did not contact any witnesses named in statement).
111
In re Wolfram, 847 P.2d 94, 100 (Ariz. 1993) (lawyer suspended for failing to
read grand jury transcript, examine physical evidence, or interview witnesses in felony child abuse case).
112
See, e.g., id. at 104 (Corcoran, J., concurring) (noting that, although lawyer’s
incompetent representation ultimately resulted in an improved plea bargain after
issue of ineffective assistance of counsel was raised, and a lesser sentence, and that
this may actually have been intended by counsel, it was still unethical); In re Gastineau, 857 P.2d 136, 142 (Or. 1993) (“If a lawyer does a poor job, but the client fortuitously or through the efforts of others obtains a good result, that does not excuse
the lawyer from providing competent representation or justify neglecting the case.”).
113
Gastineau, 857 P.2d at 142 (no incompetence when “the accused identified the
most desirable disposition for his client and deliberately was using the tactic of not
getting in the way of a good result”).
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Of course, a failure to actually review documents would make it
impossible to comply with the procedural obligations of providing
114
specific factual information about each document objected to.
At
most, a general privilege objection could be made as to all documents. Thus, the lack of factual investigation would necessarily lead
to procedural violations and a violation of Model Rule 3.4, which is
115
discussed in more detail below.
Additional support for the proposition that failing to review
documents prior to claiming privilege is ethically impermissible may
be found in the 2004 version of Model Rule 3.1, which specifies that
“[a] lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact . . . that
116
is not frivolous.”
The comments add that while an action is not
frivolous “merely because the facts have not first been fully substantiated or because the lawyer expects to develop vital evidence only by
discovery . . . [w]hat is required of lawyers, however, is that they in117
form themselves about the facts of their clients’ cases.”
It should be noted that both the reference to a basis “in fact” in
the body of Model Rule 3.1, and the requirement in the comment
that lawyers inform themselves about the facts, were 2002 additions to
118
119
Neither the previous version of Model Rule 3.1,
Model Rule 3.1.
120
nor its predecessor, Model Code provisions 7-102(A)(1),(2), made
any specific reference to factual investigation or grounding for litigation actions. Indeed, the overwhelmingly subjective focus of the
predecessor sections of the Model Code—prohibiting only the know121
ing or obvious making of a claim unwarranted by law —may have
actually protected lawyers whose lack of factual investigation made it
impossible for them to know the claim was unwarranted.
The shift to an objective test in the 1983 version of Model Rule
122
3.1, on the other hand, was intended to bring the ethical standard

114

See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5) (requiring specific information about privileged documents be provided “in a manner that . . . will enable other parties to assess
the applicability of the privilege or protection”).
115
See infra Part III.B.3.
116
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2004).
117
Id. cmt. 2.
118
Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1(as amended 2002), with
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1(2001).
119
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1(2001).
120
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(1), (2) (1969).
121
Id.
122
See ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (5th ed. 2003), supra note 84,
at 316.
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in line with the procedural law of frivolous litigation actions. Since
the 1983 version of Rule 11 expressly required a certification that the
124
action “is well grounded in fact,” it seems likely that the previous
wording of Model Rule 3.1, requiring a “basis . . . that is not frivo125
lous,”
implicitly included a reasonable attempt to discern the
126
The Reporter’s Explanation to the 2002 amendments to
facts.
Model Rule 3.1 confirms this by stating that the 2002 changes were
127
not intended to make a change in substance, and that the new language was added simply “to remind lawyers that they must act rea128
sonably to inform themselves about the facts and law.” At the same
time, Model Rule 3.1 is generally understood to allow little or no factual investigation if there is no time to do so before an action protecting the client must be taken, such as filing to avoid a statute of limita129
tions deadline. It does seem, however, that this excuse is not likely
130
to apply to privilege objections to document requests.
The crucial question under Model Rule 3.1 is whether a lawyer’s
pre-objection failure to even read documents claimed to be privileged would be an ethical violation if, by chance, the documents were
subsequently determined to be privileged. Does Model Rule 3.1 target the frivolous manner in which the objection was made independent of the end result? Prior to the objective turn in Model Rule 3.1,
frivolousness was understood as having both an objective and subjec123

See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 86, at 164 (the objective test of Model Rule
3.1 was developed to track procedural law).
124
FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
125
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2001).
126
E.g., In re Kurker, No. BD-2002-0052, 2002 WL 32254626, at *2 (Mass. State Bar
Disciplinary Bd. Oct. 24, 2002) (suspending from practice, under the original version
of Model Rule 3.1, an attorney who filed a suit on behalf of himself alleging a conspiracy between the judges and opposing counsel in a prior case involving his own
interest in a family business without interviewing any potential witnesses, investigating, or having any evidence or reasonable personal knowledge to support the allegations).
127
ABA Center for Professional Responsibility, Model Rule 3.1 Reporter’s Explanation
of Changes, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k/e2k-rule31rem.html (last visited Dec.
12, 2006).
128
Id. cmt. 2.
129
See ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (5th ed. 2003), supra note 84,
at 319.
130
Lawyers finding themselves with insufficient time to review documents for
privilege and other objections before a deadline to produce has passed should either
have gotten to work earlier or should apply for an extension of time in which to respond, rather than take a pile of unexamined papers and declare them all privileged
simply to protect possible client rights in a time crunch. Even missing a deadline
without an extension is not going to have the dire consequences of passing a statute
of limitations deadline without filing a complaint.

STRASSBERGFINAL

2007]

1/15/2007 11:57:13 AM

PRIVILEGE CAN BE ABUSED

445

tive component. A lawyer who believes there is no factual support for
a claim has no subjective basis for claiming privilege. If facts necessary to support a claim of privilege are not in fact present, there is
also no objective basis for the claim. If such facts are present, there is
an objective basis for the claim. The predecessor to Model Rule 3.1,
Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(2), required that there be neither an ob131
jective basis for the claim nor a subjective basis. Thus, a lawyer who
could show that she did believe facts to be present, even though she
had done no investigation, and the facts were not in fact present,
would not violate the ethical rule.
The turn to an objective standard in Model Rule 3.1 was clearly
meant to remove the additional requirement that only a lawyer with
132
no subjective belief in a claim would violate the rule. If the claim is
objectively frivolous, it is now no defense that the lawyer did not real133
ize it.
It is possible, however, to eliminate the requirement of subjective knowledge yet still require that an attorney engage in the kind
of investigatory conduct normally required to produce a subjective
belief that there is a basis for the claim. This is precisely what the
2003 amendments accomplished. Language added to the comments
emphasized the conduct requirement that lawyers “inform themselves about the facts” as an essential aspect of avoiding making a
134
Further, the ABA itself has described Model Rule
frivolous claim.
135
Whether this should be
3.1 as including a “duty to investigate.”
understood to impose an independent duty to investigate, such that
lack of factual investigation of objectively factually grounded claims
would be an ethical violation, remains unclarified.
As the same issue has arisen under Rule 11, it may be instructive
to consult the case law dealing with this very issue. The 1983 amendments to Rule 11 were adopted one day before the Model Rules were
136
first approved to replace the Model Code.
The amendments to
137
Rule 11, for the first time, imposed a “reasonable inquiry” requirement on litigants. This reasonable inquiry requirement was designed
to move the standard away from judgments about a lawyer’s good
131
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(2) (1969) (prohibiting the
lawyer from “[k]nowingly advancing a claim or defense that is unwarranted”).
132
Lancelloti v. Fay, 909 F.2d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 1990).
133
Id.
134
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 cmt. 2 (2004).
135
ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (5th ed. 2003), supra note 84, at
319.
136
See ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (3d ed. 1996), supra note 38,
at 300.
137
See VAIRO, supra note 87, at 9 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (amended 1983)).
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faith in bringing a claim, which necessitated a focus on the subjective state of mind of the attorney. However, two possible objective
targets emerged to take the place of the lawyer’s good faith. The reasonable inquiry standard could be read to require particular prefiling conduct by lawyers—which would then immunize the result—
or it could be read to require a final product, which could have re139
sulted from reasonable pre-filing conduct.
Initially, courts applying the 1983 version of Rule 11 tended to
focus on the product or filing itself and the issue of whether it was
140
substantively frivolous.
If the product was seen as either not “well
141
grounded in fact [or not] warranted by existing law,” then courts
142
presumed that a reasonable inquiry could not have occurred.
Using this approach, however, courts had great difficulty articulating a
143
“workable test for frivolousness.” Since it is easier to agree on what
a reasonable inquiry should have been than it is to agree on what result a reasonable inquiry should have produced, it has been argued
144
that courts should shift their focus to the actual pre-filing conduct.
Indeed, at least one commentator has suggested that the design of
the 1993 amendments to Rule 11 was meant “to focus judicial inquiry
primarily on the reasonable inquiry-conduct aspect of Rule 11, rather
145
than the content of paper per se.”
Additional focus by the courts on the reasonable inquiry element of Rule 11 produced two differing approaches. Most circuits
have adopted a two-part test, in which sanctions may not be imposed
unless there has been both a finding that a filing is baseless and a
146
finding that this would have been revealed by a reasonable inquiry.
138

Id. at 9 n.57.
Id. at 244.
140
Id. (noting that although the 1983 amendment to Rule 11 did not use the word
“frivolous,” courts often used this term as a paraphrase of “reasonable inquiry”).
141
Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (as amended through 1983)).
142
Id.
143
VAIRO, supra note 87, at 244–45.
144
Id. at 247.
145
Id. (citing William W. Schwarzer, Rule 11: Entering a New Era, 28 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 7 (1994)).
146
In re Keegan Mgmt. Co. Sec. Lit., 78 F.3d 431, 434 (9th Cir. 1996) (explicitly
determining that a pre-filing lack of reasonable inquiry into facts was irrelevant when
prior to trial, facts emerged which prevented the complaint from being frivolous);
Jones v. Int’l Riding Helmets, Ltd., 49 F.3d 692, 695 (11th Cir. 1995) (stating the
Rule 11 test as looking first to see if claims are objectively and substantively frivolous,
then considering whether a reasonable inquiry would have revealed this at the time
the claims were made); Calloway v. Marvel Entm’t Group, 854 F.2d 1452, 1470 (2d
Cir. 1988) (explaining that the Rule 11 test requires no showing of an adequate prefiling inquiry if an objectively reasonable evidentiary basis for a claim emerged pre139
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Thus, an actual reasonable inquiry will immunize what turns out to
147
A few circuits have
be an objectively frivolous filing and vice versa.
taken the position that a pre-filing failure to investigate the facts is
148
sufficient to justify Rule 11 sanctions even if “the attorney . . . gets
149
Thus, it remains an open question under Rule
lucky in discovery.”
11 whether subsequent discovery of supporting facts should excuse
150
the earlier failure to investigate.
An important commentator on Rule 11, Georgene Vairo, has argued that Rule 11 should not be read to impose an independent requirement of an actual reasonable inquiry where facts emerge that
make a claim not substantively frivolous because the resulting non151
frivolous filing does not create an improper burden to the system.
Further, the fact that sanctions loom if the filing is substantively frivolous should provide sufficient motivation for attorneys to investigate
152
Vairo also points out that this approach “limits satellite
the facts.
153
litigation,” i.e., litigation about the litigation, which creates its own
burden on the courts. Vairo does suggest, however, that the failure
to engage in factual investigation is unethical even if it should not be

trial or at trial), rev’d in part sub nom. Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Group, 493
U.S. 120 (1989) (reversing only sanctions against the law firm after holding that signatory lawyer, but not law firm of signatory lawyer, could be sanctioned under Rule
11).
147
Brunt v. Serv. Employees Int’l Union, 284 F.3d 715, 721 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Even
‘objectively frivolous filings support but do not compel an inference of unreasonable
investigation.’”) (quoting Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont’l Bank, 880 F.2d 928, 933 (7th
Cir. 1989)).
148
Garr v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 22 F.3d 1274, 1279 (3rd Cir. 1994) (“[A] signer
making an inadequate inquiry into the sufficiency of the facts and law underlying a
document will not be saved from a Rule 11 sanction by the stroke of luck that the
document happened to be justified”); Lichtenstein v. Consol. Serv. Group, 173 F.3d
17, 23 (1st Cir. 1999) (stating in dictum that “a party who brings a suit without conducting a reasonable inquiry and based on nothing more than a prayer that helpful
facts will somehow emerge, and who through sheer fortuity is rewarded for his carelessness, is nevertheless vulnerable to sanctions”). But see Kale v. Combined Ins. Co.
of Am., 861 F.2d 746, 759 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that when a reasonably competent
attorney would have found non-frivolous legal grounds for a complaint, the fact that
the filing attorney was not aware of these grounds at the time of filing would not justify Rule 11 sanctions, and suggesting that the same would apply to a pre-filing lack of
factual grounds that was remedied later).
149
VAIRO, supra note 87, at 251.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
Id.
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grounds for sanctions in itself. Thus, we may take Rule 11 case law
as recognizing the impropriety of making a claim without reasonable
inquiry into the fact even though there is disagreement as to whether
Rule 11 sanctions are an appropriate way to express this judgment.
If we may conclude that the ethical duty to avoid frivolous claims
includes an independent duty not to make claims in a frivolous manner—here, meaning without reasonable inquiry into the facts—it remains only to consider whether such an independent duty is in any
way problematic in the specific context of claims of attorney-client
privilege. Does our duty to preserve the attorney-client privilege require that we allow attorneys to make unnecessarily fact-blind claims
of privilege because some of these communications will legitimately
require the protection of the privilege?
In fact, the danger of chilling the assertion of objectively nonfrivolous claims of privilege by independently prohibiting fact-blind
claims of privilege is minimal. First, the probability of a negative impact on legitimate privilege is quite small. Unlike improper purpose,
which may as easily accompany non-frivolous privilege claims as frivolous privilege claims, it would be extremely rare for a truly fact-blind
155
claim of privilege to hit the mark. Furthermore, while an improper
purpose probably cannot be “deleted” from the lawyer’s or client’s
psyche to clear the way to make a substantively non-frivolous claim, it
is simple to remedy the lack of factual investigation and remove any
negative impact on privilege. All that a lawyer needs to do is evaluate
the communications before making the privilege objection. Thus, it
seems consistent with Model Rule 3.1’s emphasis on a primarily objective standard, as well as the recent elimination of improper purpose as a relevant factor, to view Model Rule 3.1 as containing an independent duty to reasonably examine the facts surrounding the
communication sought to be disclosed.
In addition, it is highly unlikely that an ethical requirement of a
reasonable pre-filing factual investigation of documents will result in
lawyers choosing to disclose communications rather than take the
time to conduct a factual evaluation. Lawyers are already quite clear
that allowing a waiver of privilege to occur in this way would be a vio154
Id. (“[I]t would be perverse to reward the losing party with his attorney’s fees
solely to make sure that the winning attorney complies with his or her ethical obligations.”).
155
See, e.g., Am. Med. Sys. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., No. CIV.A. 98-1788, 1999
WL 970341, at *10 (E.D. La. Oct. 22, 1999) (imposing sanctions when counsel obviously failed to review documents such as “blank documents, letters to and from opposing counsel, [and] published cases” before objecting to their production as either
attorney-client privileged or work-product privileged).
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lation of their ethical duty of confidentiality as well as malpractice.
The only result of such a duty to investigate would be to increase the
probability of reasonable pre-filing factual investigation prior to the
making of privilege claims. Furthermore, this result will not be provided at the expense of further burdening the courts with satellite
litigation. Perhaps, as Vairo suggests, it might be inappropriate to
156
award attorney’s fees to the side losing the motion to compel, but it
does seem necessary to recognize in some arena that the “winning”
attorney acted in a manner that is unacceptable when an inadequate
factual inquiry was made.
Thus, a comment to Model Rule 3.1 designed to focus the attention of attorneys on the particular ethical concerns raised by claims of
attorney-client privilege should address the frivolous practice of making claims of privilege without reasonable factual investigation of the
communications in question sufficient to ensure that facts supporting
the basic legal elements of privilege are present.
2.

Lack of Legal Research of Analysis

As is the case with a lack of factual investigation, a lawyer’s failure to do legal research or analysis will usually lead to the filing of legally frivolous claims. Setting aside for the moment those cases in
which a claim is also substantively frivolous, we focus here on claims
157
that are meritorious, or for which “avant garde” legal arguments
are dreamed up only after a motion for sanctions has been filed.
The ethical duty of competence as defined by Model Rule 1.1
requires that “[a] lawyer . . . provide . . . [the] preparation reasonably
158
necessary for the representation.”
Such preparation includes “in159
Thus, lawyers
quiry into . . . [the] legal elements of the problem.”
have been disciplined for incompetence under Model Rule 1.1 or its
160
predecessor, Disciplinary Rule 6-101(A)(2), for: filing a complaint
without researching whether there was a legal cause of action for the

156

See VAIRO, supra note 87, at 251.
Pathe Computer Sys. Corp. v. Kinmont Indus., 955 F.2d 94, 97 (1st Cir. 1992)
(describing novel theories of jurisdiction argued for the first time to support a motion to transfer at the sanctions hearing as “avant garde” and sufficient to avoid being
sanctioned for failure to make a reasonable inquiry that the filing was warranted by
law, but suggesting that the timing of the legal research and analysis supported the
district court’s imposition of sanctions for improper purpose).
158
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2002).
159
Id. cmt. 5.
160
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101(A)(2) (1983). “A lawyer shall
not: . . . handle a legal matter without preparation adequate in the circumstances.”
Id.
157
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facts alleged; failing to do sufficient research to discover possible
162
causes of action; undertaking a probate matter without any re163
search into the basic law; and for failing to read a governing stat164
ute.
In addition to undertaking appropriate preparation, Model Rule
1.1 also requires that lawyers have the “legal knowledge . . . necessary
165
for the representation.” The interaction between the requirements
of knowledge and preparation reflects the different paths lawyers may
take to achieve competence in a particular matter as well as the differing levels of knowledge required for matters that are complex and
unique compared to matters that are simple and routine. A lawyer
with highly specialized and up-to-date knowledge of the law and a
great deal of experience with similar cases may already have the legal
knowledge necessary and need little or no additional preparation in
166
A novice lawyer may need remedial
the form of legal research.
study and research merely to master the basics of the law in an area,
with additional focused research as required by the particular legal
167
Alternatively, a novice lawyer or
issues raised by the client’s case.
an experienced lawyer unfamiliar with an area of the law can consult
168
with a more knowledgeable lawyer.
In cases of alleged incompetence involving relatively basic matters, courts may therefore focus on a practitioner’s lack of requisite
knowledge rather than on his lack of research. In such cases, courts
161
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Henry, 664 S.W.2d 62, 63–64 (Tenn. 1983)
(suspending under Disciplinary Rule 6-101(A)(2) an attorney who filed civil rights
and libel complaint based on the receipt of obscene material in the mail).
162
In re Disciplinary Proceedings against Zautcke, 508 N.W.2d 387, 388–89 (Wis.
1993) (attorney “conducted no substantive legal research into any of the potential
causes of action”).
163
Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Hensley, 661 P.2d 527, 530 (Okla. 1983) (finding a lack of
competence, not merely in attorney’s undertaking a probate matter without any initial competence in the area, but also in her “failure to ascertain what she knew to be
basic and statutorily defined points of law readily ascertainable by any member of the
bar”).
164
Neb. State Bar Ass’n v. Holscher, 230 N.W.2d 75, 79 (Neb. 1975) (lawyer failed
to check amendments to statute, but disciplined on grounds of making a false statement of law); Zautcke, 508 N.W.2d at 388–89 (lawyer failed to “review the statute governing shareholder derivative suits”); Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Zdravkovich, 762 A.2d 950, 962 (Md. 2000) (lawyer failed to read removal statute).
165
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2004).
166
Id. cmt. 1 (noting that requisite knowledge can be present from a lawyer’s general experience and specialized experience and training).
167
Id. cmt. 2 (noting that “a newly admitted lawyer can be as competent as a practitioner with long experience” and that “[a] lawyer can provide adequate representation in a wholly novel field through necessary study”).
168
Id. cmt. 1, 2.
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require lawyers to be familiar with “fundamental principles essential
169
to the practice of law.” In other cases, the lawyer may be viewed as
failing to “discover those additional rules of law which, although not
commonly known, may be readily found by standard research tech170
niques.”
Yet a third aspect of competence is legal analysis: “[c]ompetent
handling of a particular matter includes inquiry into and analysis of
171
the factual and legal elements of the problem.”
Thus, an attorney
may know the relevant facts and law yet simply assume the result
rather than undertake an analysis of the facts under the law. Alternatively, the attorney may in fact undertake an analysis, but fail to ade172
quately apply the law to the facts. In practice, it may be difficult to
distinguish these two failures.
The expected competence of lawyers with regard to the law of
attorney-client privilege has not been a matter regularly or deeply explored by courts in the context of ethical discipline. Is the law of attorney-client privilege a “fundamental principle[] essential to the
173
practice of law” such that lawyers would be expected to simply know
it without doing any research? Certainly, a case could be made that
competence in a lawyer must include knowledge of the basic legal
174
elements of attorney-client privilege, including how privilege may
175
In the absence of this knowledge, an attorney will be incabe lost.
pable of fulfilling her ethical duty to protect attorney-client privileged
176
communications, as that requires the ability to identify what is and
169

People ex rel. Goldberg v. Gordon, 607 P.2d 995, 996 (Colo. 1980) (lack of
knowledge demonstrated by lawyer’s attempted use of probate proceedings to transfer property owned as joint tenants with a right of survivorship); see generally
ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (5th ed. 2003), supra note 84, at 19
(citing cases indicating that a lawyer must be “familiar with well-settled principles of
law applicable to a client’s needs”).
170
ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (5th ed. 2003), supra note 84, at
19 (quoting Baird v. Pace, 752 P.2d 507, 509 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987)).
171
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 5 (emphasis added).
172
See generally ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (5th ed. 2003), supra
note 84, at 21 (collecting disciplinary cases involving misapplication of laws such as
the Internal Revenue Code, child support guidelines, and federal sentencing guidelines).
173
Goldberg, 607 P.2d at 997 (lawyer attempted to effect a transfer of decedent’s
assets, owned in joint tenancy with widow, through a probate proceeding).
174
See infra note 186.
175
Such as by waiver or under the crime-fraud exception.
176
See ABA Comm’n on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-385
(1994) (A “lawyer has a professional responsibility to seek to limit the subpoena, or
court order, on any legitimate available grounds (such as the attorney-client privilege, work product immunity, relevance or burden), so as to protect documents as to
which the lawyer’s obligations under Rule 1.6 apply.”).
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is not privileged. Furthermore, assessments of privilege may have to
be made quickly when monitoring the testimony of one’s client in a
deposition or on the witness stand. The basic elements should not be
something that a competent lawyer needs to look up.
The privilege objections of most concern here—objections to
written civil discovery requests—are of a type that does not require
“seat-of-the-pants” knowledge of attorney-client privilege. Thus, we
need not be concerned about precisely where we would draw the line
between an essential basic knowledge of privilege and legal principles
that can be learned or relearned by some study or research. It is sufficient to say that prior to filing objections based on attorney-client
privilege, attorneys need to have this basic knowledge. A lack of such
knowledge, combined with the recognition of an ethical duty to protect attorney-client privilege, will lead lawyers to make substantively
frivolous claims of privilege.
177
In re Ryder, one of the few ethics cases to involve an improper
claim of privilege, is a case that illustrates the consequences of a lack
178
of basic knowledge about attorney-client privilege.
Ryder, an experienced private practice attorney and former Assistant United
States Attorney, transferred a bag of money he knew had been stolen
from a bank and a sawed-off shotgun he knew had been used to
commit a crime from a client’s safety deposit box to his own safety
179
deposit box.
Ryder kept the existence and location of these items
180
Within a few weeks, his client had been arrested and a
secret.
181
search warrant for Ryder’s safety deposit box had been issued.
When Ryder revealed to the court that he intended to move to suppress the items found in his safety deposit box, the court removed
him as counsel, suspended him from practice before the court, and
182
ordered that charges be brought against him.
At the time he took possession of the money and shotgun, Ryder
thought that the transfer would cloak these items with attorney-client
privilege and that the transfer would work to prevent the client from
being connected to these instruments and fruits of the crime. Ryder
177

263 F. Supp. 360 (E.D. Va. 1967), aff’d, 381 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1967).
Ryder was a proceeding to strike an attorney from the roll of attorneys qualified
to practice before a federal district court. Ryder, 263 F. Supp. at 361. It is not a typical disciplinary case involving state bar supervision and enforcement of ethical violations, but the federal court did refer to and rely on the ethical rules of the state in
which it sat, the Virginia Canons of Professional Ethics. See id. at 367, 369.
179
Id. at 363.
181
Id.
183
Id. at 363–64.
178
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is not described as having done any legal research prior to taking this
action; however, he did consult with a former bar association officer
prior to taking this action, and he subsequently consulted with a former judge and law professor, a current state judge, and a state attor183
So, rather than doing research to supplement his initial
ney.
knowledge of the attorney-client privilege, Ryder consulted with
other attorneys.
If the advice Ryder had received had been good, his consultations with other attorneys would have been an adequate replacement
184
for initial knowledge or a duty to research. It is difficult to tell from
the opinion to what extent, if at all, he asked or was advised regarding
the application of attorney-client privilege to these objects. Much of
the advice he received was simply that he should not retain the
185
The advisors may have been more fomoney if he did receive it.
cused on Ryder’s possible criminal liability as an accessory rather
than on the attorney-client privilege rationale. Based on his own
misapprehension of the law of attorney-client privilege, which was not
cleared up by the advice he received—either because the advice did
not go directly to this point, because the attorneys advising him were
similarly confused, or because Ryder ignored what they said—Ryder
took and maintained possession of these items believing that they had
become privileged.
Ryder’s misapprehension can be traced to his failure to either
know or understand one or more of the basic elements of attorney186
187
client privilege.
Only communications may be privileged.
Mere
physical objects, which do not contain some kind of oral or written
188
communication encoded upon them, are not communications. No
non-frivolous argument could have been made in Ryder’s case to
suggest that either the money or the shotgun were “communications.” Furthermore, the transfer of the objects to Ryder was not for
184

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 1, 2 (2004).
Ryder, 263 F. Supp. at 363–64.
186
In re Ryder, 381 F.2d 713, 714 (4th Cir. 1967) (“Viewed in any light, the facts
furnished no basis for the assertion of an attorney-client privilege.”).
187
See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292 (McNaughton Rev. ed. 1961) (“(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as
such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by
the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.”) (emphasis added).
188
See Commonwealth v. Stenhach, 514 A.2d 114, 119 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986)
(“[P]hysical evidence of a crime in the possession of a criminal defense attorney is
not subject to a privilege.”). Documents, which are physical objects with writing on
them, are viewed as communications. See RICE, supra note 26, § 5:2, at 40 (“oral and
written communications . . . have . . . been the primary focus of the privilege”).
185
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the purpose of legal advice, but for the purpose of concealment. Finally, even if the objects had been “communications” “from the client
to the attorney” for the purpose of “legal advice,” the transfer of possession was for the purpose of concealing evidence from the police
189
This would
and assisting the client in the commission of a crime.
have triggered the crime-fraud exception to the privilege, had the
190
privilege even attached in the first place.
In the opinion, the court mentions that Ryder improperly relied
191
on two cases involving documents held by lawyers. It is not possible
to know whether these were cases that Ryder was aware of and relied
on at the time he concluded that the attorney-client privilege would
attach, or whether these cases were discovered afterwards and first
argued to the court by Ryder or his counsel in an attempt to avoid the
threatened discipline. We do know, however, that counsel conceded
192
at the hearing that privilege did not attach despite these cases.
If we assume that Ryder did not know of these cases at the time
he took and maintained possession of these objects, then Ryder may
be viewed as a case in which an attorney failed to know or understand
fundamental principles of the law that a competent attorney is expected to know. Even if Ryder consciously had these cases in mind
when he determined that the transfer of the objects to him would
make them privileged, his equation of the documents at issue in
these cases and the non-communication bearing objects he was dealing with reveals how important basic knowledge is. Without this
foundation, case law cannot be properly understood and applied to
new situations.
It should be pointed out that the court did not frame Ryder’s
misconduct as a form of incompetence because the standard for removing a licensed attorney from the rolls of those admitted to practice before a federal court required a showing of misconduct that was
193
“fraudulent, intentional, and the result of improper motives.”
The
court found that Ryder acted outside of the bounds of the law in
holding the stolen money and shotgun in violation of Canon 15, and
194
rendered a service disloyal to the law in violation of Canon 32. For
the purposes of that proceeding, therefore, Ryder’s intent to hide his
client’s participation in this crime and his illegal acts in support of
189
190
192
193
194

Ryder, 263 F. Supp. at 366–67.
See id. at 367.
Id.
Id. at 361.
Id. at 368.
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this purpose were of far more concern than his ignorance of the law
of privilege. It was Ryder’s ignorance of privilege, however, that
blinded him to the illegality of his conduct and thereby paved the way
195
for his illegal conduct.
A practical problem that arises in the context of legal knowledge
and analysis that does not arise in the context of factual investigation
is that it may not always be possible to establish whether a lawyer was
aware of a particular legal argument before a legal claim was made,
especially in an area of the law such as attorney-client privilege. Most,
if not all, lawyers have been exposed to some of the law of attorneyclient privilege in law school or during practice. When a question of
privilege arises, a lawyer who proceeds without any deliberate research or analysis might be said to be deciding on the basis of an unconscious, intuitive application of whatever they had previously
grasped about privilege law. The same cannot be said about the particular facts of a case. A lawyer who has not received this information
cannot possibly have learned it before.
It seems likely that Ryder was proceeding on the basis of some
knowledge of privilege rather than total ignorance, but in his case, a
little knowledge was more dangerous than complete ignorance might
have been. The fact that he knew something made him confident
enough to avoid the minimal steps of reviewing the legal elements of
privilege and analyzing the facts under those elements. It also may
have prevented him from checking relevant case law. In Ryder’s case,
even the consultation of four other attorneys, whose advice either
missed the point or was ignored, might not have been enough to pre196
vent him from being viewed as incompetent.
195
Compare Ryder, 263 F. Supp. at 370 (merely suspending Ryder rather than disbarring him because he intended to return the money to the bank and had attempted to determine whether his actions were ethical by consulting reputable
members of the bar), with Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Harlton, 669 P.2d 774, 777 (Okla. 1983)
(disbarring attorney whose concealment of a shotgun used in a crime by another was
not because of the “misguided zeal of an attorney in defense of his client,” but rather
“as a personal accommodation to its perpetrator”).
196
Ryder did not associate the lawyers he consulted with on the case, which Model
Rule 1.1 suggests can provide competence where there would otherwise be none. See
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 2 (2004) (“Competent representation
can also be provided though the association of a lawyer of established competence in
the field in question.”). As a result, the lawyers who provided the advice did not have
their reputations and licenses on the line and might, therefore, not have given the
issue the analytic effort they would have exercised had they been guiding their own
conduct. Thus, it may well be that reliance on the informal legal advice of others is
insufficient. Without associating the advising lawyer, a lawyer seeking advice must
rely more or less blindly on another because she does not have the competence to
judge or re-evaluate the advice given.
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Of course, it is not possible to rely on Ryder to establish that
claims of privilege made in a frivolous manner are unethical even if
not substantively frivolous, as the claims of privilege in Ryder were
substantively frivolous. Ryder was not a case where in hindsight it was
possible to see that there was a non-frivolous legal argument that
might have justified advancing the claim of privilege. But Ryder does
help us think about the complex nature of legal knowledge and
preparation and analysis, as well as how serious the consequences of
this kind of incompetence can be.
We can also consider the extent to which the 2003 version of
Model Rule 3.1 would make merely failing to research the law of
privilege and to analyze the facts under the law prior to claiming
privilege ethically impermissible even when non-frivolous legal arguments can be made. Model Rule 3.1 specifies that “[a] lawyer not
bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue
therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact . . . that is not frivo197
lous.” The comments add that:
What is required of lawyers, however, is that they inform themselves about . . . the applicable law and determine that they can
make good faith arguments in support of their client’s position.
Such action is not frivolous even though a lawyer believes that the
client’s position ultimately will not prevail. The action is frivolous, however, if the lawyer is unable either to make a good faith
argument on the merits of the action taken or to support the action taken by a good faith argument for an extension, modifica198
tion or reversal of existing law.

Thus, the rule, together with its comments, identifies two distinct targets: making a claim for which there is no non-frivolous basis in law
(objective substantive legal frivolousness) and failure to engage in legal research and analysis prior to filing (frivolous conduct). Unfortunately, neither the text of Model Rule 3.1 nor its comments clarify
whether a lucky stab in the dark is an ethical violation.
As might be expected, the vast majority of disciplinary cases under Model Rule 3.1 involve substantively frivolous cases in which no
199
good faith argument is available to be discovered by legal research.
In such cases it is obvious that either the lawyer did not do the re200
search, did research but failed to understand what she found, or
197

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1.
Id. cmt. 2.
199
See generally ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (5th ed. 2003), supra
note 84, at 317–18 (collecting cases finding no good faith argument).
200
In re Richards, 986 P.2d 1117, 1120 (N.M. 1999) (lawyer misunderstood cited
case).
198
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discovered a lack of merit but proceeded anyway. When a lawyer
blindly makes a winning claim or even a losing, but non-frivolous
claim, it is less obvious that they have done so blindly, particularly if
she corrects her failure to do pre-filing research and analysis prior to
any ruling on the merits by the trial court. Thus, the disciplinary apparatus is quite unlikely to ever learn about a lawyer’s improper prefiling conduct and consider whether the pre-filing conduct itself violated Model Rule 3.1.
At least one court has found a violation of Model Rule 3.1 where
201
the lawyer eventually articulated a “unique” but good faith argument on the merits in defending the disciplinary action, but had
failed to make that argument to the trial court in his response to a
202
Of course, in this case, the lawyer
motion for summary judgment.
simply failed to cover up his lack of research and analysis as quickly as
most lawyers would once the merits were challenged. Had the lawyer
put the effort into his client’s case that he put into his own disciplinary case, we would never have known about the pre-filing lack of effort. It is also not clear that the court would have been willing to find
a violation of Model Rule 3.1 if the good faith argument had been
developed in time to respond to the motion for summary judgment,
as this would have made it available in time to try to help the client.
Most courts facing this issue in the context of Rule 11 have concluded that if an objectively reasonable, i.e., non-frivolous, legal
ground has eventually appeared, Rule 11 sanctions cannot be imposed, even though these legal grounds were neither known nor dis203
covered at the time the litigation action in question was taken. This
approach to the Rule 11 reasonable inquiry requirement has been
204
justified by the need to limit satellite litigation as well as the fact
that the possibility of sanctions for substantively frivolous claims al-

201

In re Boone, 7 P.3d 270, 282 (Kan. 2000).
Id. (finding a violation of Model Rule 3.1 even though the court also found
that the lawyer’s continuing argument for retroactive application of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, despite settled case law that the Act is not retroactive, was a
good faith argument).
203
See, e.g., Kale v. Combined Ins. Co., 861 F.2d 746, 759 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding
that a non-frivolous equitable tolling argument prevented imposition of sanctions
even if the attorney filing the case was unaware of the equitable tolling doctrine until
well after filing the complaint); Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Eng’g, 982 F.2d
363, 370 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Because the frivolousness prong of Rule 11 is measured by
objective reasonableness . . . whether Unigard actually relied on these cases is irrelevant.”); Jones v. Int’l Riding Helmets, 49 F.3d 692, 695 (11th Cir. 1995) (without an
initial finding that the claims were objectively frivolous as to the facts or law, no need
to consider whether a reasonable inquiry was made).
204
Kale, 861 F.2d at 759.
202
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ready motivates lawyers to engage in reasonable legal inquiry and
205
206
Yet, at least two circuits have taken the position with reanalysis.
gard to legal, as well as factual inquiry, that “[a] shot in the dark is a
207
sanctionable event, even if it somehow hits the mark.”
These circuits argue that this approach both provides better deterrence of
208
baseless claims and “ensures that each side really does bear the ex209
penses of its own case” without creating a chilling effect on aggres210
sive advocacy.
In the ethical context, we have identified as our primary concern
the overall litigation impact created by claims of privilege that force
opposing litigants to make fairly blind choices about what information they will pursue through a motion to compel, that divert financial resources available for the litigation, and that often deprive litigants of information they are entitled to have. These consequences
are present in what I will call “losing” cases, when the information is
not in fact privileged and would have to be disclosed if the issue were
actually litigated. Of these losing cases, only some portion would be
viewed as frivolous from a substantive legal perspective.
One approach to the ethics of privilege would be to follow the
majority approach to Rule 11 and require both substantive frivolousness and a lack of legal knowledge, inquiry, or analysis before finding
an ethical violation—thus viewing the “legally-blind” assertion of nonfrivolous losing claims of privilege as ethical. Such an approach
205

See VAIRO, supra note 87, at 252; see also Garr v. U.S. Healthcare, 22 F.3d 1274,
1283 (3d Cir. 1994) (Roth, J., dissenting).
206
Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont’l Bank, 880 F.2d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc)
(the reasonableness of an attorney’s inquiry “focuses on inputs rather than outputs,
conduct rather than result”); Mays v. Principi, No. 01 C 1418, 2002 WL 15704, at *4
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 4, 2002) (citing Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont’l Bank, 880 F.2d 928 (7th
Cir.1989) (the focus of Rule 11 analysis is on input rather than output)); Garr, 22
F.3d at 1279 (“[A] signer making an inadequate inquiry into the sufficiency of the
facts and law underlying a document will not be saved from a Rule 11 sanction by the
stroke of luck that the document happened to be justified”); see also Linda Ross
Meyer, When Reasonable Minds Differ, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1467, 1490 (1996) (arguing
that the Supreme Court endorsed the Seventh Circuit’s emphasis on attorney conduct when, in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 394, 401–02 (1990), the Court
described determinations of frivolousness as requiring factual determinations about
the pre-filing inquiry rather than pure questions of law).
207
Garr, 22 F.3d at 1279 (quoting Vista Mfg., Inc. v. Trac-4 Inc., 131 F.R.D. 134,
138 (N.D. Ind. 1990)).
208
Id.
209
Mars Steel Corp., 880 F.2d at 932 (arguing that it is improper to force the other
side to do your research for you in order to defend themselves).
210
Id. (“Sanctuary as a result of a reasonable investigation ensures that counsel
may take novel, innovative positions—that Rule 11 does not jeopardize aggressive advocacy or legal evolution.”).
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might be justified by the practical reality that we are only likely to become aware that a lawyer has failed to engage in appropriate prefiling legal research and analysis when we realize that she has made a
substantively frivolous claim. Thus, it might seem that independent
sanctioning of pre-filing conduct of this kind is of no value.
It would be a mistake, however, to confuse the reality of enforcement with the appropriateness of a threat of enforcement with
regard to behavior that is deemed problematic. The ethical rule
211
against knowingly suborning client perjury is similarly problematic,
as it is exceedingly difficult to discover when lawyers have violated this
rule, yet this has not suggested that the rule be abandoned. The
most important question is whether the conduct in question is in fact
unethical, and only secondarily whether the ethical rule creates the
possibility of deterring the conduct.
When making “legally-blind” claims of privilege, the lazy lawyer
is in no position to judge whether the claim is truly frivolous, is a nonsanctionable loser, or is a winner. In the absence of a rule that sanctions the conduct of making a “legally blind” privilege claim, the lazy
lawyer may take a chance either that no one will challenge the privilege claim to discover its possible lack of merit, or that, if challenged,
the claim will be viewed as substantively non-frivolous. Given the fact
that the opposing lawyer is operating in the dark about the possible
value of the information claimed to be privileged, and the high cost
of challenging many individual claims of privilege, the lazy lawyer
might reasonably see the odds tilting away from possible sanction.
Lawyers should at least be discouraged from strategic behavior that
has such a significant negative impact on the adversary system.
The ethical legitimacy of the second calculation—that the claim
may be non-frivolous—is more difficult to assess. The risk of sanctions will appear less if lawyers believe that the line between substantively frivolous and legitimate claims of privilege is sufficiently unclear
that good faith arguments, even if unsuccessful, are likely to be available if it is necessary to defend an assertion of privilege. It would not
be surprising if many lawyers did not in fact have this view of the law
of attorney-client privilege. If this were true, then there would be little ethical value in forcing attorneys to engage in pre-filing legal research or analysis for attorney-client privilege claims. The reasonableness of this assumption will be considered below, and I will argue
that while some areas are still unclear, the law of privilege is clear
enough for a reasonably prepared lawyer to determine whether many
211

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2004).
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claims of privilege are substantively frivolous. This makes the strategic choice to make a “legally blind” claim of privilege both unnecessary and unethical.
Therefore, lawyers should be ethically required to follow a procedure that should ensure sufficient legal research and analysis when
there is time for such a process, e.g., in the context of written interrogatories or document requests rather than objections to testimony.
Such a procedure might begin with a requirement that lawyers remind themselves of the legal elements of privilege, either by forcing
the detailed recall of these elements from memory or by reviewing an
appropriate case law or treatise source. Additionally, lawyers should
be required to either be aware of those factual issues that require additional reference to case law or statutes rather than the basic formula, such as pre-existing documents, organizational clients, client
identity information, and information about evidentiary objects the
lawyer has moved or altered, or be prepared to research beyond the
basic formula in every case. Finally, lawyers would be required to
consciously analyze the facts of each claim of privilege under the
relevant law before making the claim.
The steps articulated above are certainly examples of good practice. The issue, however, is whether failing to follow one or more of
these steps should be viewed as an ethical violation. The issue is most
clearly raised by asking whether such failures would still be ethical
violations if the claims of privilege were upheld as substantively meritorious. One problem with such an approach is that it would forbid
acting on a hunch, or what some might prefer to call an educated
guess. An attorney’s intuitive hunch about the possible legal viability
of a privilege claim may be subtly guided by the thousands of cases
and arguments read and digested, even though not explicitly remembered, during her legal education and career. Indeed, a competent lawyer should not be ignorant of the fundamentals of the law of
privilege. The question remains, however, whether it is unethical to
act on a hunch when there is, or should be, time for real legal analysis.
My inclination is to say that acting on a hunch is an ethical violation even when the hunch turns out to be correct and the informa212
tion is privileged. Although the result in such a case is good for the
212
See, e.g., Tuszkiewicz v. Allen-Bradley Co., 173 F.R.D. 239, 240 (E.D. Wisc.
1997) (requiring payment of attorney fees for an unsuccessful motion to compel
when explanation of the factual predicates for the claim of privilege at the deposition, rather than in response to the motion to compel, would have obviated the need
for a motion to compel).
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duty of confidentiality and good for the client, it need not have occurred in such a frivolous manner. By failing to condemn the conduct in this case, we simply reinforce the habit or custom of making
reflexive privilege objections, which may just as often turn out to be
frivolous rather than meritorious. Furthermore, a focus on pre-filing
conduct rather than post-hoc arguments provides an essential counterweight in an area of law where post-hoc arguments may be perceived as easily available.
Finally, making such conduct an ethical violation would not chill
claims of privilege or undermine the duty of confidentiality because
the ethical and legal consequences of missing such a claim are too
great. It seems unlikely that lawyers would choose to simply disclose,
rather than undertake the necessary research and analysis, as this
would be easily recognized as a potential violation of the duty of confidentiality, which requires the lawyer to “act competently to safeguard information relating to the representation of a client against
213
Since coninadvertent or unauthorized disclosure by the lawyer.”
cern for confidentiality motivates the lazy lawyer to blindly claim
privilege rather than blindly disclose, it seems unlikely that even the
lazy lawyer would allow privileged material to be improperly disclosed, even if it required him to do work he would prefer to avoid.
All but the most ethically reprehensible lawyer would react to a specific ethical prohibition on blind claims of privilege with some level
of factual and legal analysis of the privilege status of requested materials.
Thus, a new comment to the Model Rules designed to focus the
attention of attorneys on the particular ethical concerns raised by
claims of attorney-client privilege should address the practice of filing
claims of privilege without the necessary legal knowledge or analysis.
3.

Lack of a Complete Privilege Log

The third and final way in which a lawyer may make a claim of
privilege in a frivolous manner is by objecting to discovery requests
on the grounds of privilege either without providing a privilege log,
as required by procedural rules such as Federal Rule of Civil Proce214
215
dure 26(b)(5) or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(d)(2), or by
213

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 15.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5) (“When a party withholds information otherwise discoverable under these rules by claiming that it is privileged or subject to protection
as trial preparation material, the party shall make the claim expressly and shall describe the nature of the documents, communications, or things not produced or disclosed in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected,
214
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providing a privilege log that fails to fully comply with these rules.
Although the precise informational requirements of privilege logs
217
vary from district to district, all logs require some minimum specific
factual information. Thus, the requirement of a privilege log ensures
that at least some factual investigation of the claimed privileged
communication has occurred prior to the claim. Some courts also
require a statement as to “how each element of the privilege is met as
218
to that document,” thus forcing legal analysis prior to a claim of
privilege.
Making a general claim that one or more documents is privileged without submission of such a privilege log is often a manifesta219
tion of a lack of pre-filing factual investigation and legal analysis.
Thus, it is at least partially possible to ground an ethical prohibition
on asserting privilege without following applicable privilege log rules
on the prior discussions of the ethical status of pre-filing factual investigation, legal research, and legal analysis. Even if these ethical prerequisites to a claim of privilege have occurred, however, the absence
of a privilege log places an impossible burden on the requesting party
because they have no information upon which they might base a chalwill enable other parties to assess the applicability of the privilege or protection.”);
see, e.g., Starlight Int’l Inc. v. Herlihy, 186 F.R.D. 626, 646 (D. Kan. 1999) (finding
sanctionable misconduct for asserting attorney-client privilege in a deposition without a privilege log or other explanation for refusing to answer questions).
215
FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(2) (“When information subject to a subpoena is withheld
on a claim that it is privileged or subject to protection as trial preparation materials,
the claim shall be made expressly and shall be supported by a description of the nature of the documents, communications, or things not produced that is sufficient to
enable the demanding party to contest the claim.”).
216
More detailed requirements for such logs are set out in local court rules and
case law and typically include: “(1) the type of document, (2) the general subject
matter, (3) the date and (4) such other information sufficient to identify it for a subpoena duces tecum, including, where appropriate, the author, the addressee and,
where not apparent, the relationship of the author and addressee to each other.”
Michael Silverberg, The Burden of Producing Privilege Log, N.Y. L.J., May 9, 1996, at 3
(describing Southern District of New York Civil Rule 46(e)(2)(ii)(A) and case law).
Courts may also require additional information such as the purpose of the document
and a description of how each legal element of privilege is met. See Burns v. Imagine
Films Entm’t, Inc., 164 F.R.D. 589, 594 (W.D.N.Y. 1996).
217
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5).
218
Id. See United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1044 n.20 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating
that the resisting party should have made an “attempt to demonstrate . . . [the] specific way that . . . particular document[s] fell within the ambit of the privilege”); Willemijn Houdstermaatschaapij BV v. Apollo Computer Inc., 707 F. Supp. 1429, 1439
(D. Del. 1989) (requiring “description of the documents within its scope as well as
precise and certain reasons for preserving their confidentiality”).
219
See Eureka Fin. Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 136 F.R.D. 179, 183
n.9 (E.D. Cal. 1991) (“All too often, the blanket privilege is asserted by counsel who
have not carefully reviewed the pertinent documents for privilege.”).
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220

lenge to the claim of privilege. Thus, it is the unfair and impossible
221
position in which the requestor of information is placed that specifically requires the attention of the ethical rules.
Model Rule 3.4, titled “Fairness to Opposing Party and Coun222
sel,” provides strong support for the proposition that making a
claim of privilege with an incomplete or missing privilege log is already unethical under the current Model Rules. Model Rule 3.4(c)
prohibits a lawyer from “knowingly disobey[ing] an obligation under
the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an asser223
tion that no valid obligation exists.” Thus, attorneys have been disciplined under Model Rule 3.4(c) for failing to respond to interroga224
tories and requests for production.
Since filing a privilege log, as
defined by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5), local rules, and
case law, is such an obligation, a failure to do so clearly violates Model
Rule 3.4. In addition, Model Rule 3.4(d) states that “[a] lawyer shall
not . . . in pretrial procedure . . . fail to make a reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing
225
The comments to Model Rule 3.4 state that the rule inparty.”
226
cludes a prohibition of “obstructive tactics in discovery procedure.”
Since making a general privilege objection without filing the privilege
log that provides the factual and legal basis for the claim may be
viewed as a failure to diligently comply with a discovery request or as
an obstructive tactic, Model Rule 3.4(d) provides further support for
the proposition that privilege log failures are already unethical.
In the procedural context, many courts encountering violations
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5) or 45(d)(2) have been
quite willing to sanction the conduct, even at the expense of legitimate claims of privilege, by summarily denying all such claims of
227
privilege and compelling production.
Some courts, mindful of the
220
See Delaney, Migdail & Young, Chartered v. IRS, 826 F.2d 124, 128 (D.C. Cir.
1987) ( “[A]n index of the withheld material, summarizing, in factual and not conclusory terms, the nature of the material withheld and linking each specific claim of
privilege to specific material . . . helps overcome the . . . natural handicap” arising
from a lack of access to the documents.).
221
See Eureka Fin. Corp., 136 F.R.D. at 183 n.9 (describing blanket privilege objections as “defeating the full and fair information disclosure that discovery requires”).
222
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (2004).
223
Id. M.R. 3.4(c).
224
See In re Gabriel, 837 P.2d 149 (Ariz. 1992); In re Boone, 7 P.3d 270, 283 (Kan.
2000).
225
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(d).
226
Id. cmt. 1.
227
See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 274 F.3d 563, 575–76 (1st Cir. 2001) (describing failure to provide a privilege log as a “fatal” error resulting in waiver of the
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harsh effects of such a consequence, have tried to avoid “hair-trigger
228
findings of waiver” by providing resisting parties with a second
229
chance to produce such a log, or by imposing a different kind of
230
sanction.
Although it seems fairly apparent that it is already an ethical violation to fail to follow court rules and fail to file a sufficiently detailed
privilege log when making a claim of privilege, it is worth pointing
out that this specific application of Model Rule 3.4 is entirely consistent with, and does not chill, the duty of confidentiality. When considering the ethical prohibition of previous kinds of frivolous claims
of privilege—improper purpose, insufficient factual or legal investigation, and lack of legal analysis—there was always a concern that this
might undermine the duty of confidentiality by chilling claims of
privilege that ought to be made. In this situation, however, one of
the procedural sanctions for not filing the privilege log—waiver of
privilege—makes a failure to file a privilege log a potential violation
231
Thus, the duty to preserve priviof the duty to preserve privilege.
lege and the duty to not claim privilege in a procedurally frivolous
manner are strategically and ethically linked together.
Thus, the proposed new comment to the Model Rules can specify that claims of privilege will be unethical when made in the ab-

privilege); Dorf & Stanton Commc’n v. Molson Breweries, 100 F.3d 919, 923 (Fed.
Cir. 1996) (applying Second Circuit law to affirm a waiver of privilege for failing to
file a complete privilege log in violation of Rule 45(d)(2)); Cabot v. United States,
35 Fed. Cl. 442, 446 (1996) (ordering production of documents when justification
for claims of privilege ordered under Federal Claims Court rules was not provided);
Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 653–54 (D. Kan. 2005) (a
waiver of possibly privileged metadata resulted from unilaterally scrubbing metadata
from produced electronic spreadsheets without objecting and listing metadata on
privilege log).
228
See, e.g., Hobley v. Burge, No. 03 C 3678, 2003 WL 22682362, at *5 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 12, 2003) (quoting 8A WRIGHT & MILLER § 2213 at 428 (2006)).
229
See, e.g., United States v. W. Elec. Co., 132 F.R.D. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1990) (choosing
not to impose a waiver of privilege as a sanction for failing to file a privilege log, but
rather to provide a second chance for such log to be prepared and provided).
230
See, e.g., Hobley, 2003 WL 22682362, at *5 (refusing to find a waiver of privilege
for failure to file a privilege log, but granting sanctions in the form of attorney’s fees
instead).
231
See, e.g., Coastal Corp. v. Duncan, 86 F.R.D. 514, 520 (D. Del. 1980) (requiring
production of all documents claimed to be privileged because “[a]n improperly asserted claim of privilege is no claim of privilege at all”); Jones v. Boeing Co., No. 941245-MLB, 1995 WL 827992, at *1 (D. Kan. Aug. 30, 1995) (refusing to conduct an in
camera review of documents prior to compelling their production when claimant’s
“blanket” claim of privilege and failure to show that the elements of privilege had
been met would result in shifting the burden of analysis and proof to the court).
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sence of appropriate factual investigation, legal knowledge, research
and analysis, and a full privilege log.
C. Substantively Frivolous Claims of Privilege
Having established that it is unethical to make a claim of attorney-client privilege in a frivolous manner, it is now time to turn to
those claims that are substantively frivolous from an objective perspective. The vast majority of substantively frivolous claims of privilege will be those made without appropriate factual investigation, legal knowledge, research and analysis, and procedurally required
disclosure. Thus, it might seem unnecessary to address the issue of
substantive frivolousness in an ethical rule. However, there are several reasons why it is worth considering. A wicked lawyer could claim
information as privileged after engaging in factual investigation, legal
knowledge, and legal analysis which reveals that privilege is not available. The wicked, as well as the ignorant and lazy, should be addressed by the ethical rules.
In addition, although substantively frivolous claims are most
likely to be the result of frivolous, indeed incompetent, pre-filing
practices, it might be easier to decide as a matter of law that a particular claim is substantively frivolous than to engage in a fact-intensive
232
inquiry into the details of what the lawyer did and thought.
Thus,
targeting substantively frivolous claims of attorney-client privilege
could provide a simple way to both motivate and regulate the prefiling practices of attorneys making privilege claims.
Furthermore, any determination that there has been incompetent research and analysis cannot avoid reference to the substantive
233
frivolousness or merit of the resulting claim.
Particularly when
there has been some research and analysis, the competence of such
research will, in large part, be judged by the product produced.
Thus, it will sometimes be impossible to decide whether competent
research and analysis occurred without considering the merit of the
resulting privilege claim.
An additional and particularly important reason for evaluating
substantive frivolousness in the context of attorney-client privilege is
that ethical obligations of research and analysis only make sense if the
law of attorney-client privilege is clear and predictable enough that
232

But see Meyer, supra note 206, at 1485 (arguing that judges in Rule 11 cases find
it easier to decide that a lawyer has made a claim in a frivolous manner than to decide that the claim is substantively frivolous).
233
Id. at 1494–95 (“[T]he practice-based approach does not eliminate the need
for courts to determine substantive issues.”).
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lawyers can distinguish meritorious claims of privilege from frivolous
claims. If the law of attorney-client privilege is “radically indetermi234
nate,” there will be very few substantively frivolous claims of privilege. This would make post-hoc factual investigation, legal research,
and legal analysis much more of a reasonable practice and undermine the conclusion reached above that failure to undertake these
actions prior to making the claim is unethical. Indeed, many otherwise competent and ethical lawyers probably do rationalize their failures to investigate, research, and analyze possible claims of privilege
on grounds that the law of privilege is sufficiently indeterminate to
ensure that some non-frivolous argument can be found. The truth of
this rationalization must be addressed both to justify the procedural
ethical obligations outlined above and to educate lawyers about the
real dangers of making frivolous claims of privilege.
Whether the law of attorney-client privilege is radically indeter235
minate across the board or only “modestly indeterminate” can, as
practical matter, be studied by looking at when and to what extent
courts are willing to declare claims of privilege frivolous and award
236
sanctions. If the law of attorney-client privilege is only modestly in237
determinate, as will be asserted here, it should be possible to provide lawyers with some practical guidance about what does and does
not make a claim of privilege frivolous. This guidance can take two
distinct forms. The first is general guidance about the kind of legal
support required to make a claim non-frivolous. The second kind of
guidance addresses the specific legal requirements of attorney-client
privilege and attempts to identify specific kinds of claims of privilege
or problematic elements that produce frivolous claims.

234

Id. at 1468–70 (defining radical indeterminacy in the law as meaning that valid
legal arguments can be on either side of any legal issue).
235
Id. at 1470 (characterizing indeterminacy only in “small pockets” of the law as
modestly indeterminate).
236
Id. at 1480 (stating that deciding whether a legal claim is frivolous is equivalent
to deciding whether the law relevant to that claim is indeterminate).
237
See TASK FORCE REPORT ON ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, supra note 19, at 4 (“At
the margins, the application of the privilege is not always clear, and indeed, treatises
can and have been written on the privilege, its exceptions, its intricacies, and its areas
of ambiguity.”).
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General Characteristics of Substantively Frivolous
Claims

As Model Rule 3.1 “parallels and is best analyzed in tandem with
238
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” we can look to
both disciplinary cases under Model Rule 3.1 and sanction cases under Rule 11 for more specific guidance as to when a claim is frivolous.
We can also include Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(g)(2) cases
imposing sanctions for frivolous discovery positions, as language similar to that found in Rule 11—“warranted by existing law or a good
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
239
240
law” —is found in Rule 26 as well.
Model Rule 3.1 prohibits “assert[ing] or controvert[ing] an issue
. . . unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modifi241
Similar language can be found
cation or reversal of existing law.”
242
in Rule 11. The comments to Model Rule 3.1 add that an “action is
frivolous, however, if the lawyer is unable either to make a good faith
argument on the merits of the action taken or to support the action
taken by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or re243
Good faith requires that there be “some reversal of existing law.”
244
alistic possibility of success if the matter is litigated,” but the lawyer
245
need not believe that the position supported will ultimately prevail.
The Arizona Supreme Court has described the standard of objective
frivolousness in both the ethical and legal context as requiring that
238

ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (5th ed. 2003), supra note 84, at

321.
239

FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2)(A) (1983) (also adding the words “or the establishment of new law”); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(2); see Byron C. Keeling, Toward a Balanced
Approach to “Frivolous” Litigation: A Critical Review of Federal Rule 11 and State Sanctions,
21 PEPP. L. REV. 1067, 1078 (1994).
240
Of course, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 does not cover “disclosures and
discovery requests, responses, objections, and motions that are subject to the provisions of Rules 26 through 37.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11(d). However, the jurisprudence
with regard to the basic standard of frivolousness is the same. In re Byrd, Inc., 927
F.2d 1135, 1137 (10th Cir. 1991) (applying Rule 11 case law to Rule 26(g)(2) determinations and citing multiple circuits that do likewise).
241
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2004).
242
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2) (where the claim in not “warranted by existing law,” it
can still avoid being sanctioned under Rule 11 if it is “warranted . . . by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the
establishment of new law”).
243
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 cmt. 2.
244
ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985) (setting out the standard for advising a position on a tax return).
245
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 cmt. 2.
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there be support by “any reasonable legal theory, or if a colorable legal argument is presented about which reasonable attorneys could
246
differ.”
It is possible to distinguish two kinds of substantive frivolous247
ness: pure factual frivolousness and a combination of legal and factual inadequacy. Pure factual frivolousness will only arise when insufficient factual investigation coupled with a competent grasp of the
law leads the lawyer to assume facts sufficient under the law, when the
248
facts are not actually sufficient.
This form of substantive frivolousness needs little further explication, but will be specifically fleshed
out in the context of the attorney-client privilege below. The combination of legal and factual inadequacy arises when the lawyer is aware
of facts inconsistent with the law, yet insists the law applies, or when
the lawyer is aware of law adverse to the facts, yet insists a different legal result applies. The difference between these two descriptions of
frivolousness is more a matter of perspective than substance. The former looks more like Cinderella’s sisters insisting that their feet are
small enough to fit in the glass slipper, when they are clearly too
large. We might describe this as obliviousness to inconsistent or miss249
ing facts, while grasping that the law requires such facts. The latter
could be said to be present if Cinderella’s sisters had realistic ideas
246

In re Levine, 847 P.2d 1093, 1100 (Ariz. 1993).
Visoly v. Sec. Pac. Credit Corp., 768 So. 2d 482, 491 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)
(“[A]n appeal which lacks a factual basis or well-grounded legal argument will be
considered devoid of merit.”).
248
A possible example of this may be found in Bowne of New York City, Inc. v. AmBase Corp, 161 F.R.D. 258, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), where the court found no substantial
justification for privilege claims both when the claimant conceded in response to the
motion to compel that many documents had been improperly withheld and many
questions had been improperly not answered, and where plaintiff never established
the factual predicate for limited waiver as to other communications. See also Heath v.
F/V Zolotoi, 221 F.R.D. 545, 550–51 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (frivolous claim that witness
statements created in ordinary course of business were privileged was result of failure
to ask client about the circumstances of statement, which showed “not even a scintilla
of evidence” of attorney involvement and justified default judgment on liability and
$25,000 personal fine to attorneys).
249
See, e.g., Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Ronwin, 557
N.W.2d 515, 521 (Iowa 1996) (frivolous suit when all evidence showing no causal
connection to claimed injury, but lawyer included defendant as trial tactic); In re
Zimmerman, 19 P.3d 160 (Kan. 2001) (disciplining a lawyer under Model Rule 3.1
for a frivolous appeal of summary judgment after lawyer failed to oppose summary
judgment because lawyer recognized that his failure to hire an expert to show seat
belt defect meant no genuine issue of material fact regarding defect and no good
faith basis for an opposition); In re Selmer, 568 N.W.2d 702, 703–04 (Minn. 1997)
(racial discrimination defense to collection actions against lawyer were frivolous
when lawyer could provide no specific evidence of discrimination other than his
race).
247
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about the large size of their feet, but either were convinced that the
slipper was going to be large enough despite never having seen it, or
had somehow magnified the size of the slipper when they did see it.
This happens in a legal context when a lawyer has a realistic view of
250
the facts, but misunderstands the law and its application, is igno251
rant of the law, or refuses to accept that the law relied upon re252
quires different or additional facts.
This also includes situations
when lawyers do not even try to address arguments and cases cited by
253
the other side, when they fail to distinguish controlling adverse au254
255
thority, when they assert irrelevant distinctions, or when they take
250

See, e.g., In re Capoccia, 709 N.Y.S.2d 640, 643 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (“[Respondent] attempt[s] to shoehorn laws and legal concepts to a set of facts where they
have no application.” (quoting Providian Nat’l Bank v. McGowan, 687 N.Y.S.2d 858,
863 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1999))).
251
See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Zdravkovich, 762 A.2d 950, 965
(Md. 2000) (finding an ethically frivolous removal to federal court when plaintiff attempted to remove from Texas state court to federal court in Maryland, but statute
allowed only defendant to remove and then only to federal court in Texas, and
speculating that lawyer had not bothered to read statute); Boca Investerings P’ship v.
United States, No. CIV.A. 97-602PLF/JMF, 1998 WL 647214, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 1,
1998) (party position not substantially justified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(4) when failed to discover controlling precedent); Vinton v. Adam Aircraft Indus., Inc., 232 F.R.D. 650, 663 (D. Colo. 2005) (finding no abuse of discretion
in a magistrate’s imposition of sanctions for claim of privilege found not to be substantially justified because supported by only a single conclusory sentence claiming
privilege).
252
See, e.g., In re Brough, 709 So. 2d 210, 210 (La. 1998) (per curiam) (finding
that the filing of a suit against the insured of an insolvent insurance carrier and its
legal successor was ethically frivolous when statute barred suits unless uninsured motorist policy limits were exhausted); In re Richards, 986 P.2d 1117, 1119 (N.M. 1999)
(“Respondent would have been aware of the extremely limited parameters of the exception to the general rule that a property owner cannot have a lien on his own
property had he further researched . . . . Indeed, had he done so, he would have
found cases very similar to the Peterson foreclosure where the exception had been
found inapplicable.”); Bowne, 161 F.R.D. at 266 (finding no substantial justification
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(4) for withholding documents as attorney-client privileged when factual predicate for limited waiver not established).
253
See, e.g., Athridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 184 F.R.D. 200, 207 (D.D.C. 1998)
(“[R]unning from the fight by ignoring what one’s opponent has said is not a substantially justified position for a litigant to take.”); Bowne, 161 F.R.D. at 265 (no substantial justification when memorandum “fail[ed] to acknowledge the existence of”
controlling authority prominently discussed by moving party).
254
See, e.g., Bowne, 161 F.R.D. at 266 (finding no substantial justification under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(4) for withholding documents as attorneyclient privileged when sanctioned party used “the ostrich-like tactic of pretending
that potentially dispositive authority against a litigant’s contention does not exist”);
Athridge, 184 F.R.D. at 206 (awarding expenses for the motion to compel because
“running from the fight by ignoring what one’s opponent has said is not a substantially justified position for a litigant to take”); Prousi v. Cruisers Div. of KCS Int’l,
Inc., No. 95-6652, 1997 WL 135692, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 1997) (ordering payment
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the general position that no argument is frivolous if the Supreme
256
Court of the United States has not yet rejected it on the merits.
At the same time, the prohibition on frivolous litigation is not
meant to “chill the creativity that is the very lifeblood of the law
[when] [v]ital changes have been wrought by those members of the
257
bar who have dared to challenge the received wisdom . . . .”
If
“there is no controlling precedent on the issue, and counsel marshals
what authority there is in support of her position, the position she articulates will be found to be substantially justified even if it does not
258
prevail.” When potentially dispositive adverse authority exists, how259
ever, it must both be acknowledged and a “cogent argument” must
260
be made. Thus, it is not sufficient to acknowledge the lack of legal
261
support but assert simpliciter that the law should be different to
of the other side’s fees and expenses for a motion to compel disclosure of the date of
a fee agreement when the lack of privilege was easily researched and clearly addressed by Third Circuit precedent).
255
See, e.g., In re Caranchini, 956 S.W.2d 910, 915 (Mo. 1997) (finding that a lawyer “disregarded well-established Kansas law” and “presented a distinction without a
difference . . . to distinguish the court’s previous decision on this issue”); Flaherty v.
Gas Research Inst., 31 F.3d 451, 459 (7th Cir. 1994) (frivolous under Rule 11 to argue case holding that courts had no jurisdiction to hear age discrimination claims
until a final administrative order did not apply to a retaliation for opposing age discrimination claim when both claims encompassed by same statute).
256
See, e.g., People v. Hartman, 744 P.2d 482, 483–85 (Colo. 1987) (frivolous to
argue that the Supreme Court of the United States might accept the argument that
wages are not income when the United States Tax Court has rejected the same argument for many decades and recently stated that raising such an argument would
be viewed as frivolous); In re Solerwitz, 848 F.2d 1573, 1577–78 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (rejecting expert testimony of law professor that it is not frivolous to remake same arguments to appellate court despite that court’s precedent rejecting such arguments
as long as the Supreme Court has not decided these issues on the merits).
257
Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 1985).
258
Boca Investerings P’ship v. United States, No. CIV.A. 97-602PLF/JMF, 1998 WL
647214, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 1, 1998); see also Maddow v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 107
F.3d 846, 853 (11th Cir. 1997) (no sanctions because the attorney was “substantially
justified in relying on Supreme Court dictum regarding the attorney’s fees issue, and
relying on out-of-circuit district court caselaw, where there was no in-circuit caselaw”).
259
See Bowne, 161 F.R.D. at 266 (sanctions justified when litigant used “the ostrichlike tactic of pretending that potentially dispositive authority against a litigant’s contention does not exist,” even though a valid argument for changing law could have
been made); Omni Packaging, Inc. v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 930 F.
Supp. 28, 34 (D.P.R. 1996) (reminding counsel of ethical duty under Model Rule 3.1
to cite unfavorable binding precedent); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 110 cmt. d (2000) (stating that a good faith argument requires disclosing
adverse precedent).
260
In re Richards, 986 P.2d 1117, 1120 (N.M. 1999).
261
FED. R. CIV. P. 11. The Advisory Committee notes to the 1993 Amendments
state that the new objective standard is intended to eliminate any “empty-head pure-
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avoid being viewed as frivolous. Arguments demanding a change
must first be sought through legal research, and support must be
found, even if only “in minority opinions, in law review articles, or
262
In cases where other
through consultation with other attorneys.”
jurisdictions have developed law more supportive than the controlling adverse authority, failure to point to this inconsistency will make
263
the claim frivolous.
A new comment to the Model Rules designed to focus the attention of attorneys on the particular ethical concerns raised by claims of
attorney-client privilege could usefully point out that claims of privilege are frivolous if they are missing essential facts, are based on ignorance or misreading of the law of privilege, fail to acknowledge
and appropriately distinguish controlling adverse authority, or are
based on a change or reversal of existing law without providing argument and support for such a change.
2.

Specific Claims of Privilege that Are Substantively
Frivolous

We now turn to considering the extent to which the law of attorney-client privilege may be described as determinate, thereby allowing for claims of privilege to be considered frivolous. The analysis of
this issue will be limited to a review of some of the specific factual
situations in which claims of attorney-client privilege have regularly
heart’ justification for patently frivolous arguments.” Id. Accord Eastway Constr.
Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 575 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (noting that the first
challenge to Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1898), was certainly frivolous while later
challenges became non-frivolous and ultimately prevailed). Although not expressly
stated by the Eastway court, we may understand its position on the frivolousness of
early challenges as founded on a lack of new arguments or reason to believe old arguments would be better received, while half a century later, social change, the use
of empirical evidence, and the development of the law provided both new arguments
and new weight to old arguments. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 110 cmt. d (noting that the presence of new authority, new arguments,
and a new court can be sufficient to ground a good faith argument for change).
262
FED. R. CIV. P. 11, Advisory Committee Notes (1993); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 110 cmt. d (describing considerations relevant
to the presence of a good faith argument for change as including “whether the lawyer in question or another lawyer established a precedent adverse to the position being argued (and, if so, whether the lawyer disclosed that precedent), whether new
legal grounds of plausible weight can be advanced, whether new or additional authority supports the lawyer’s position, or whether for other reasons, such as a change
in the composition of a multi-member court, arguments can be advanced that have a
substantially greater chance of success”).
263
See Bowne, 161 F.R.D. at 266 (noting that had the party argued when first challenged that “the law was unsettled,” substantial justification for withholding documents would have been found).
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been deemed either frivolous or non-frivolous by the courts. Such
findings arise in a variety of contexts, including motions for sanction
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(4) (discovery abuse)
and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (liability for excessive costs due to unreasonable
and vexatious multiplication of proceeding), as well as contempt
hearings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(e) (failure to obey
264
a subpoena) and the inherent power of the courts.
The discussion of these cases will be generally organized according to the basic elements of privilege at stake. Although many courts
cite to the highly articulated Judge Wyzanski definition of attorney265
266
client privilege from United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,
the somewhat simpler Wigmore definition will mostly suffice here:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought
(2) from a professional legal advisor in his capacity as such,
(3) the communications relating to that purpose
(4) made in confidence
(5) by the client,
(6) are at his instance permanently protected
(7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor,
267
(8) except the protection be waived.

a.

Frivolous Because No Legal Advice

The requirement that legal advice be sought will undermine
privilege claims when no advice whatsoever is sought from an attorney or when the type of advice sought is business, scientific, or literary, or related to public relations or any other non-legal advice. In

264
See, e.g., NASCO, Inc. v. Calcasieu Television & Radio, Inc., 894 F.2d 696, 702
(5th Cir. 1990) (“federal courts have inherent power to police themselves by civil
contempt, imposition of fines, the awarding of costs and the shifting of fees”), aff’d
sub nom. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991).
265
EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 46 (describing the Wyzanski formulation as “much
quoted”).
266
89 F. Supp. 357, 358–89 (D. Mass. 1950):
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is
or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate
and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer;
(3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for
the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii)
legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d)
for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has
been (a) claimed [by the client] and (b) not waived by the client.
Id.
267
8 WIGMORE, supra note 187, § 2292, at 554.
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general, deciding whether legal advice is being sought is first a highly
fact-dependent evaluation. In addition, there are particular factual
settings about which courts do not always agree whether the nature of
268
Thus, whether a claim
the service is legal or predominantly legal.
that legal advice is involved can be viewed as frivolous may well depend on the particular factual setting and the settled or unsettled na269
ture of the legal analysis governing this setting in this jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, courts have been willing to describe some attempts to
cloak communications to lawyers that do not seek legal advice or that
involve non-legal concerns as frivolous and deserving of sanctions.
270
In FDIC v. Hurwitz, sanctions were awarded for, among other
egregious misconduct by the FDIC, claiming privilege for purely in271
272
vestigative work by attorneys.
In Cobell v. Norton, sanctions were
granted for attorney-client privilege objections to questions that
would have revealed at most the content of lawyer-client conversa273
tions about the client’s schedule and availability for a deposition.
As the client’s communications about her schedule were not provided for the purpose of seeking advice at all, they failed to meet this
274
Sanctions were justified in this case bebasic element of privilege.
cause, despite a nineteen-page memorandum citing four “supportive”
cases, the position taken by the Justice Department was deemed not
275
The court imsupported by case law, and thus legally frivolous.
posed the more extreme sanction of requiring the attorneys to personally pay the costs of the motion to compel because this attempt to
“obstruct[] a legitimate inquiry into whether her co-counsel had lied
to the Court . . . [was] made more repugnant by the fact that defense
268
See RICE, supra note 26, § 7:9, at 65 & n.94 (describing three different positions
taken by the Eighth Circuit, the Second Circuit, and the Northern District of Illinois
with regard to the preparation of tax returns by an attorney); see also id. § 7:17, at 79–
80 (describing the en banc reversal of a decision in Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meridith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977), that legal advice was not sought from attorneys retained by corporations to investigate allegations of illegal practices).
269
See generally RICE, supra note 26, §§ 7:10–26, at 69–110 (summarizing legal advice case law in a variety of factual settings).
270
384 F. Supp. 2d 1039 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (awarding over $72 million in attorney’s
fees and costs arising out of a baseless lawsuit that was abusively pursued over many
years).
271
Id. at 1097 (privilege does not attach when lawyers are acting as executives, investigators, or regulators).
272
213 F.R.D. 16 (D.D.C. 2003) (granting motion to compel and sanctions where
privilege claimed for conversation about client’s schedule and availability for a deposition).
273
Id. at 31.
274
Id. at 24.
275
Id. at 29–31.
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counsel [was] not only an officer of the court, but a representative of
276
the Department of Justice.”
Advice was sought from an attorney in Amway Corp. v. Procter &
277
Gamble Co.; however, since it concerned the negative public relations consequences of suing nuns, priests, and ministers who had repeated allegations of a connection between Satanism and Procter &
278
This conclusion was further bolGamble, it was not legal advice.
stered by the fact that copies of the documents seeking this advice
279
were simultaneously circulated to numerous non-legal personnel.
The opinion states that, as a general rule:
Where . . . in-house counsel appears as one of many recipients of
an otherwise business-related memo, the federal courts place a
heavy burden on the proponent to make a clear showing that
counsel is acting in a professional legal capacity and that the
280
document reflects legal, as opposed to business, advice.

As a result of these and other frivolous claims of privilege, as well as
Procter & Gamble’s failure to provide adequate affidavit support for
its claims of privilege, the magistrate judge recommended a sanction
in the form of an order establishing a fact suggested by the non281
privileged, but improperly withheld, documents.
Similarly, in American Medical Systems, Inc. v. National Union Fire
282
Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., attorney’s fees were awarded as a
283
sanction for frivolous claims of attorney-client privilege for trans284
mittal letters and documents sent to both legal and non-legal per285
Transmittal letters are not viewed as involving legal advice
sonnel.
286
because they “merely transmit documents to or from an attorney.”
When documents are sent to both legal and non-legal personnel, they
are not viewed as “made for the primary purpose of seeking legal ad287
vice.”
276

Id. at 31.
No. 1:98-CV-726, 2001 WL 1818698 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 3, 2001).
278
Id. at *7–8
279
Id. at *5.
280
Id.
281
Id. at *11.
282
No. Civ.A. 98-1788, 1999 WL 816300 (E.D. La. Oct. 7, 1999).
283
Id. at *3 (no “good faith effort to produce relevant, non-privileged documents”
when 236 out of 346 documents were found non-privileged).
284
Id.; see also Amway Corp. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., No. 1:98-CV-726, 2001 WL
1818698, at *4 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 3, 1999) (holding that transmittal letters that “contain no facts tending to reveal the client’s confidences” are not privileged).
285
Am. Med. Sys. Inc., 1999 WL 816300, at *1.
286
Id. at *2.
287
Id. at *1.
277
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As these cases illustrate, lawyers who assume that the “legal advice” element of attorney-client privilege is met simply because a lawyer has sent or received a communication run the risk of making a
frivolous claim. This element of privilege is particularly problematic
when the attorney receiving the communication is in-house counsel,
because these positions involve non-legal as well as legal duties. Indeed, courts place the burden on the in-house counsel claimant of
288
privilege to show that legal rather than non-legal advice was sought.
The difficulty of proving attorney-client privilege becomes even
greater if the lawyer is merely one of many recipients of a copy of a
289
document.
Another problematic context for privilege arises when lawyers
are present at corporate meetings and engaged in non-legal corpo290
rate business, often as a voting member of the committee.
A careful factual evaluation of the context in which the communication was
made must take seriously the possibility that non-legal advice may
have been sought, and recognize the extra burden created by multiple non-lawyer recipients of the communication.
Given the highly fact-dependent nature of such legal advice
291
analyses, especially in the corporate context, it is unlikely that the
assertion of privilege in such situations will be viewed as substantively
frivolous as long as affirmative factual support is provided and an argument is made regarding the legal nature of the advice. Thus, in
292
Burton v. R.J. Reynolds, while nearly all communications concerning
288

RICE, supra note 26, § 7:1, at 21–22, § 7:2, at 24–25 (citing numerous cases
holding that an affirmative showing that the communication was for legal rather
than non-legal advice is necessary when the attorney is in-house counsel).
289
Courts are wary of the practice of “funneling” sensitive, but non-legal, documents to or through corporate attorneys, with copies to the non-legal personnel who
really need the information and then claiming that all the copies of the document
are privileged. See generally Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Am. Gas Ass’n, 320 F.2d 314, 324
(7th Cir. 1963) (stating in dictum that a corporation cannot “funnel its papers and
documents into the hands of its lawyers for custodial purposes and thereby avoid disclosure”); RICE, supra note 26, § 7:2, at 24. If, however, one copy of a document is
sent to an attorney for legal advice and other copies are sent to non-lawyers for business purposes, or one item in a document requests legal advice while others request
business advice, courts may protect the copy that went to the attorney or redact the
parts of the document that seek legal advice. Id. § 7:2, at 34.
290
Marten v. Yellow Freight Sys., No. CIV. A. 96-2013-GTV, 1998 WL 13244, at
**8–9 (D. Kan. Jan. 6, 1998) (finding that a committee with a voting attorney that
met to decide whether to terminate an employee had a predominantly business
rather than legal purpose).
291
RICE, supra note 26, § 7:2, at 32.
292
200 F.R.D. 661, 680 (D. Kan. 2001) (denying sanctions where “some (though
not many)” privilege claims were upheld and where “the legal principles governing
the privilege disputes in this case are somewhat unsettled in this particular context”).
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scientific evidence on the health effects of smoking cigarettes were
293
found to involve public relations or general business advice, the
294
In
court refused to sanction the claims of attorney-client privilege.
part, this refusal was due to a few successful privilege claims. The
court, however, seemed to view the novel factual context of this
case—in which tobacco corporation attorneys had extensive control
over scientific and public relations matters, at the same time that litigation over the health risks of tobacco was on-going—as making the
295
application of the legal principles more complicated. Nonetheless,
296
the court did describe as “avoidable” some of the effort both the
plaintiff and court were forced to expend to resolve the privilege
questions, and further described tobacco counsel as not using the
best professional practice when they failed to acknowledge and argue
297
the adverse law of the case on these privilege issues.
More recently, the Seventh Circuit has described claims of privilege involving “distinguishing in-house counsels’ legal advice from
298
their business advice” as “an area of privilege law that is generally
299
recognized to be ‘especially difficult.’” As a result, the court found
that such claims of privilege were made in good faith where an appropriate privilege log had been filed, and counsel exhibited good
faith by reducing the number of documents on the log from 750 to
300
465 in response to objections. However, making “blanket” privilege
301
302
claims, or failing to provide a privilege log or other support in
these contexts is particularly likely to trigger sanctions. Thus, in an

293

Id. at 669–79 (mostly rejecting attorney-client privilege claims on the grounds
that only public relations or business advice was at issue).
294
Id. at 679.
295
Id. at 680.
296
Id.
297
Id. (“[I]t would have been a better exercise in professionalism for defendants’
counsel to have acknowledged the court’s prior rulings concerning the scope of the
attorney-client privilege . . . asserted their position that the court’s prior rulings were
wrong . . . and then attempted to explain why the court’s prior rulings would not apply.”).
298
Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of the
U.S., 406 F.3d 867, 878 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing RICE, supra note 26, § 5:7).
299
Id.
300
Id. (holding that claims of privilege made in privilege logs that had been voluntarily amended twice in response to objections were not made in bad faith and
finding an abuse of discretion in the magistrate’s refusal to review a large number of
documents in camera and ordering as a sanction release of all documents upon finding a few unprivileged documents in a very limited and arbitrary in camera review).
301
RICE, supra note 26, § 7:1, at 21, § 7:5, at 47.
302
See Amway Corp. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., No. 1:98-CV-726, 2001 WL 1818698,
at *10 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 3, 2001).
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303

earlier tobacco case in Minnesota, sanctions were awarded for
304
305
claims of privilege involving the same or similar documents despite the fact that a majority of all the withheld documents were
306
found privileged.
Although this case additionally involved application of the crime-fraud exception to defeat the privilege, many
307
documents were found not to be privileged “in the first instance”
308
because they “contained nothing of a privileged nature.”
It can be
309
surmised from the general description of documents at issue here
that many of the documents were not privileged because they in310
volved non-legal advice. Sanctions were awarded because these
311
frivolous claims of privilege revealed “a pattern of abuse” arising
from either an attempt to deceive the court or a failure to engage in
the required level of legal and factual analysis of each document
312
claimed to be privileged.

303
Minn. v. Philip Morris Inc., No. C1-94-8565, 1998 WL 257214 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
Mar. 7, 1998) (magistrate opinion affirming order of special master appointed to resolve discovery disputes in suit by the State of Minnesota against a number of tobacco
companies).
304
Id. at *7 (ordering the disclosure of more than 30,000 documents in certain
categories without document-by-document evaluation when a spot check revealed
abuse of the categorization process by the inclusion of obviously unprivileged material).
305
Three categories of documents ordered disclosed in Minnesota v. Philip Morris
were described as relating to or referencing scientific research, “Special Projects,”
and public statements about smoking and health. Id. at *5–6 (requiring disclosure of
Category 3, 4(b), and 5 documents). Documents found not privileged in Burton v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 200 F.R.D. 661 (D. Kan. 2001), included position papers,
prepared congressional testimony, and position resources for public statements, Burton, 200 F.R.D. at 669 (documents 58, 86, 88, 93, 94, and 98), purely scientific documents, id. at 670–71 (documents 52, 51, 62, 68, 70,75, 85), and “Special Products”
documents, id. at 674 (document 107).
306
Philip Morris, 1998 WL 257214, at *5–6 (upholding privilege claims for as many
as 200,000 of the remaining documents).
307
Id. at *6.
308
Id. at *7.
309
Id. at *5–6 (spot checks of documents in the categories of “Science,” “Special
Projects,” and “Public Statements” revealed unprivileged documents).
310
Id. at *7.
311
Id.
312
See Philip Morris, 1998 WL 257214, at *7 (noting that despite the fact that the
court had put counsel on notice that documents listed on the privilege log had to
have been personally reviewed by counsel or those under counsel’s supervision, a
spot check of listed documents revealed many documents “clearly and unarguably
not entitled to protections of privilege”).
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Frivolous Because No Lawyer Qua Lawyer

The next element of attorney-client privilege requires that the
legal advice be sought from a lawyer in their capacity as a lawyer. A
claim of privilege for a communication to a person who is clearly not
an attorney, or an agent of an attorney, will be viewed as frivolous.
313
Thus, in Amway Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Corp., the court described
as frivolous a claim of privilege for a document in which neither the
314
author nor any of the recipients was an attorney. In Chinnici v. Cen315
tral Dupage Hospital Assoc., the court described counsel as having
316
“ignored the law of privilege,” which requires both an attorney and
a client, when the lawyer redacted a section of a memo from a nonlawyer condominium association president to other association
317
318
In Heath v. F/V Zolotoi, sanctions in the form of a
members.
$25,000 personal fine against the lawyers and a finding of liability
against the client were imposed when the lawyers failed to reveal the
existence of routine witness statements made without any attorney involvement and then subsequently made frivolous arguments that they
319
were privileged.
Claims of privilege involving communications to both a lawyer
and non-lawyer are less likely to be viewed as frivolous when the possibility exists that the non-lawyer to whom the communication was
made was an agent of the attorney. The so-called agent must be
320
needed by the attorney in order to render legal advice and must in
fact be under the direction and supervision of the attorney at the
321
time of the communications. These are primarily factual matters,
and will require lawyers to engage in the necessary level of factual investigation to ensure that the appropriate foundational facts are present and asserted in a privilege log or supporting affidavits.
However, the issue of whether particular kinds of assistance are
really required to obtain legal advice can become a matter of law.
313

No. 1:98-CV-726, 2001 WL 1818698 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 3, 2001) (granting sanctions for many different kinds of frivolous claims of privilege and failure to provide
proper affidavit support for its privilege claims in general).
314
Id. at *8.
315
136 F.R.D. 464 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
316
Id. at 466.
317
Id. (sanctions were not granted because the moving party failed to request a
discovery conference to resolve this very simple matter).
318
221 F.R.D. 545 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
319
Id. at 550–51, 553 (statement was given to persons not represented by attorney,
no attorney was present, and no attorney had requested the statements).
320
RICE, supra note 26, § 3:4, at 26–27.
321
Id. § 3:5, at 30–32.
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One issue that frequently arises in this context is whether communications with an accountant employed by the client’s lawyer are privileged when they were made for the purpose of having the accountant
prepare the client’s tax return. As many courts do not view the
preparation of a tax return by an attorney as involving legal advice,
the same work performed by the accountant is viewed as lacking a re322
lationship to legal advice. The status of psychiatric experts hired by
the defense in criminal cases is also an issue that will be resolved as a
matter of controlling law, which varies from jurisdiction to jurisdic323
Another vexing issue concerns whether communications to
tion.
324
patent agents are privileged either as communications to attorneys
325
or as communications to agents of attorneys.
While the lack of national consensus in these matters might suggest the law is indeterminate, there is settled law within some jurisdictions. Lawyers wishing to avoid substantively frivolous claims of privilege for communications to agents of attorneys must do the legal
research required to determine whether their jurisdiction has addressed the privilege issue with regard to the kind of agent at issue in
their case. Further, if the lawyer wants to challenge settled law, she
must acknowledge any negative controlling precedents and make a
colorable argument as to why a different approach should be
adopted.
c.

Frivolous Because Not Communications Relating to the
Purpose of Seeking Legal Advice

There are two distinctly different types of privilege claims that
are substantively frivolous due to failure to meet this element. The
322

Id. § 3:6, at 36; § 7.24 at 104–05.
See, e.g., Granviel v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 673, 682–83 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding that
Texas law, along with New York law, would not find communications to the psychiatrist privileged, while Michigan, California, New Jersey, and the Third Circuit would
extend the privilege to these communications); see also RICE, supra note 26, § 3:3, at
19–20 & n.33 (collecting cases applying and denying attorney-client privilege to
communications to psychiatrists assisting defense counsel).
324
See generally Jonathon G. Musch, Note, Attorney-Client Privilege and the Patent
Prosecution Process in the Post-Spalding World, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 175, 190 (2003) (discussing the continuing “lack of uniformity” in the treatment of patent prosecution
documents among the federal circuits).
325
Compare Gorman v. Polar Electro, Inc., 137 F. Supp. 2d 223, 227 (E.D.N.Y.
2001) (holding that the Second Circuit generally allows privilege to cover communications with patent agents when the agents are “‘acting under the authority and control of counsel,’” but noting that federal courts are not in agreement on this issue
(quoting Cuno, Inc. v. Pall Corp., 121 F.R.D. 198, 204 (E.D.N.Y. 1988))), with Agfa
Corp. v. Creo Prods., No. Civ.A. 00-10836-GAO, 2002 WL 1787534, at *2 (D. Mass.
Aug. 1, 2002).
323
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first involves exchanges that are not viewed as communications at all,
such as objects, observations, underlying information, and preexisting documents. The second group concerns specified kinds of
information that are not viewed as being communicated for the purpose of seeking legal advice as a matter of law, even though the information is communicated to lawyers from whom legal advice has
otherwise been sought.
i.

Non-Communications

As we have already seen in the discussion of In re Ryder, physical
objects that do not contain a message to the attorney inscribed upon
326
them are not communications.
The consequences to lawyers who
risk their licenses and freedom by making frivolous claims of privilege
327
for such items can be dire. A claim of privilege regarding an object
is most likely to be deemed frivolous when the object is evidence of a
crime and the claim is made to defend a lawyer’s possession and fail328
ure to turn over the object to police, as was the case in In re Ryder.
Attorneys who take and keep possession of such objects, believing
that they are acting within the law, are in fact courting criminal
329
prosecution.

326

See supra text accompanying note 186; see also In re January 1976 Grand Jury,
534 F.2d 719, 728 (7th Cir. 1976) (stating that money itself is not privileged); State v.
Dillon, 471 P.2d 553, 565 (Idaho 1970) (attorney-client privilege applies “only to
communicative and not real evidence”); People v. Investigation Into a Certain
Weapon, 448 N.Y.S.2d 950, 954 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982) (ordering attorney to produce
ammunition and ammunition clip, but distinguishing the tangible objects from attorney testimony about how possession of objects was obtained); Commonwealth v.
Stenhach, 514 A.2d 114, 119 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (“We join the overwhelming majority of states which hold that physical evidence of crime in the possession of a
criminal defense attorney is not subject to a privilege but must be delivered to the
prosecution.”).
327
See In re January 1976 Grand Jury, 534 F.2d at 730 (affirming the confinement
for contempt of an attorney who refused on grounds of privilege to turn over stolen
money paid to the lawyer by a client hours after robbing a bank).
328
See id. at 727–29.
329
See United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980, 1001 (1st Cir. 1987) (affirming attorney’s conviction for obstruction of justice based in part on attorney’s suggestion
that incriminatory documents be placed in his briefcase to protect them from a
search warrant); Quinones v. State, 766 So. 2d 1165, 1171 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)
(suggesting, but not deciding, that a defense attorney who kept a knife possibly used
in client’s stabbing attack for eighteen months violated the evidence tampering statute). But see Commonwealth v. Stenhach, 514 A.2d 114, 125–26 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986)
(vacating criminal sentences for attorneys who failed to turn over rifle stock on
grounds that statutes prohibiting hindering prosecution and tampering with evidence were constitutionally overbroad as applied to lawyers because they failed to
distinguish between privileged evidence such as written communications to lawyers
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A more complicated legal issue arises when an attorney is served
with a subpoena duces tecum, which requires the attorney to produce
an object, often identified as relating to, or received from, a specified
client. While the object itself cannot be claimed to be privileged, the
production of the object by the attorney in response to the detailed
subpoena request might or might not be viewed as implicitly disclosing an intentional communication to the lawyer of the fact that the
client had possession of the object prior to transferring it to the law330
If the production is viewed as testimonial, one solution is to
yer.
require the attorney to simply produce the item to the district attorney, thereby avoiding the more testimonial production to the grand
331
332
If not, the lawyer may suffer contempt sanctions.
The best
jury.
way to avoid this risk is to understand both that the object is not privileged and that it cannot be kept for any length of time by the law333
yer.
These complications, while worth being aware of because they
threaten lawyers who fail to understand them with criminal prosecution or contempt, are not particularly relevant to the issue of frivolous claims of privilege in the civil litigation context. To begin with,
an entirely different standard of frivolousness is applied to criminal
334
defense.
More importantly, information about a client’s original
possession of an object is less likely to have the kind of evidentiary

and non-privileged evidence, and because there was no settled law clarifying what
defense conduct was legal and what was not).
330
Compare State ex. rel. Sowers v. Olwell, 394 P.2d 681, 883–85 (Wash. 1964) (preserving any privilege relating to knife by requiring it to be to turned over to the District Attorney rather than produced to the grand jury in response to the subpoena,
and precluding any attempt to reveal the source of the knife to the jury) and Investigation into a Certain Weapon, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 953 (ordering lawyer to deliver ammunition clip and ammunition to district attorney rather than produce items in response
to grand jury subpoena because delivery of items by client to attorney involves a privileged communication), with In re January 1976 Grand Jury, 534 F.2d at 731 (Tone, J.,
concurring) (affirming order of confinement for contempt for lawyer’s failure to
produce items as required by grand jury subpoena because neither object nor act of
transferring money to lawyer is a communication).
331
State ex. rel. Sowers, 394 P.2d at 684–85.
332
Id.
333
Keeping the items can be a violation of the criminal law prohibiting concealment of evidence and the ethical rule also prohibiting unlawful concealment of “material having potential evidentiary value.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(a)
(2004); see also ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMIN. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE §§ 4–4.6
(1991) (setting out the circumstances under which defense counsel should and
should not deliver an object received from a client to law enforcement authorities).
334
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (“A lawyer for the defendant in a
criminal proceeding . . . [which] could result in incarceration, may nevertheless so
defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the case be established.”).
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value it often has when the object is a gun or stolen money in a
criminal case. This means that possession of information is less likely
to be viewed as an intentional communication arising out of the
transfer. Finally, such information can be easily discovered from clients due to the lack of a Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination leading merely to civil liability and the availability of
liberal civil discovery. Thus, it is usually quite unnecessary to seek this
kind of information from attorneys.
Two other kinds of non-communications are attorney observations of clients and the underlying information conveyed in the
communication. Attorney observations of client appearance, coher335
ence, etc., are not viewed as communications unless the observation
336
Simiwas made as the result of a communicative act by the client.
larly, although the fact that certain information or facts has been
communicated to an attorney is protected from disclosure by the attorney or client, the underlying information, minus the fact of com337
munication to the attorney, can be compelled from the client.
Finally, documents created independent of the attorney-client
relationship for purposes other than communicating information to
the attorney are not themselves communications from the client to
338
Even though
the attorney and are not attorney-client privileged.
such “pre-existing documents” can subsequently be used by clients to
communicate the information contained therein to lawyers, it is the
showing of the document to the lawyer that is the communication
339
Careful attention to the facts surrather than the document itself.
rounding the creation of a document is essential, especially in a business context, to determine whether the client can meet the burden of
335

See e.g., People v. Williams, 454 N.E.2d 220, 240 (Ill. 1983) (finding lawyer observation of client’s appearance and demeanor during courtroom conference unprivileged).
336
PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN & SUSAN W. CRUMP, FEDERAL TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 2:11,
at 81 (2d ed. 2006); see also Rubin v. Maryland, 602 A.2d 677, 685 n.4 (Md. 1992)
(equating demonstrative communication with verbal communication for purposes of
attorney-client privilege).
337
See RICE, supra note 26, § 5:1, at 9–11; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 896 F.2d
1267, 1270 (11th Cir. 1990) (distinguishing non-privileged underlying facts from the
privileged communication of those facts).
338
See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 404 (1976) (pre-existing documents
obtainable from client are also obtainable from attorney); In re Original Grand Jury
Investigation, 733 N.E.2d 1135, 1139–40 (Ohio 2000) (holding that a client’s letter to
his brother was not attorney-client privileged, but vacating contempt and monetary
sanctions for the attorney who refused to turn it over to a grand jury on the ground
that there was a good faith argument that ethical obligations prohibited the disclosure).
339
In re Search Warrant B-21778, 521 A.2d 422, 428 (Pa. 1987).

STRASSBERGFINAL

2007]

1/15/2007 11:57:13 AM

PRIVILEGE CAN BE ABUSED

483

proof by showing that the document was initially created for the purpose of later transmittal to the lawyer rather than for another busi340
ness purpose.
There is one exception to this rule: pre-existing documents protected by the Fifth Amendment while in the possession of the client,
but unprotected by the Fifth Amendment in the possession of the cli341
However, this is precisely
ent’s lawyer, are considered privileged.
the kind of narrow exception that requires careful attention to both
the facts of the case and the legal doctrine in order for a good faith
argument to be made regarding the privileged status of pre-existing
342
documents.
ii.

Communications Not for the Purpose of Legal Advice

The fact that there is an attorney-client relationship formed for
the purpose of seeking legal advice does not mean that all communications made in the context of this relationship are privileged. Each
individual communication must be shown to be for the purpose of
seeking legal advice. There are three kinds of information routinely
communicated to attorneys by clients that are not commonly viewed
as communicated for the purpose of seeking legal advice: identity of
client, location of client, and fee or billing information.
w. Identity of Client
The identity of the client, while certainly communicated by the
client to the attorney in the course of seeking legal advice, is in most
343
cases not viewed as protected by the attorney-client privilege.
This
result has been justified on the following grounds: no legal advice is
344
sought concerning the client’s identity; the identity of the client is
usually not intended to remain confidential and is often intended to
340
See Robertson v. Commonwealth, 25 S.E.2d 352, 360 (Va. 1943) (affirming contempt against an attorney, including a fine and striking the defenses of the client,
where the attorney had refused to produce an accident report which the court found
had not been shown to have been made for the exclusive purpose of showing the
lawyer).
341
Fisher, 425 U.S. at 404–05.
342
SEC v. Kimmes, No. M18-304, 1996 WL 734892, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 24, 1996)
(refusing to award sanctions for possibly frivolous claims of privilege regarding preexisting documents that had no Fifth Amendment protection in the client’s hands
because the requesting party had also engaged in frivolous and meritless arguments).
343
ROTHSTEIN & CRUMP, supra note 336, § 2:11, at 87.
344
See, e.g., People ex rel. Vogelstein v. Warden of County Jail, 270 N.Y.S. 362, 367–
68 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1934) (“‘The client does not consult the solicitor with a view to obtaining his professional advice as to whether he shall be his solicitor or not.’” (quoting Bursill v. Tanner, (1885) 16 Q.B.D. 1, 4 )).
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be revealed in the course of providing representation of the client in
345
dealings with non-clients; or the lawyer was hired by the client for
346
the purpose of furthering criminal activity.
Yet the analyses of these situations is complicated by the fact that
client identity will be viewed as privileged if “disclosure would reveal a
privileged confidential attorney-client communication, or where disclosure would incriminate the client, but perhaps only if it provides
the last link in a chain of evidence against him, and perhaps only if it
does so in the very criminal activity for which legal advice was
347
In addition, there is considerable variation from jurisdicsought.”
tion to jurisdiction as to the validity or applicability of this “last link”
348
or “legal advice” exception.
Finally, the actual application of the
exception is highly fact-dependent and cogent arguments can often
349
As a result, it is difficult to provide much
be made on both sides.
general guidance as to when a claim of privilege for client identity
might be viewed as frivolous.
However, as the exception continues to be the subject of consid350
erable litigation, it seems likely that the application of the exception within any single jurisdiction will become regularized. This then
creates the possibility of determining that a particular claim that falls
351
within the exception fails to make even a colorable case. The legal

345

See, e.g., United States v. Flores, 628 F.2d 521, 526 (9th Cir. 1980) (attorney
hired to file administrative claim by named client to recover guns seized in search
cannot claim privilege for name of source of information for claim).
346
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 680 F.2d 1026, 1028–29 (5th Cir. 1982) (refusing
to find the identity of a client privileged when client paid fees for persons involved in
drug smuggling who had been induced to smuggle in part by a promise that they
would be “taken care of” if arrested).
347
ROTHSTEIN & CRUMP, supra note 336, § 2:11, at 90–94 (collecting a large number of cases showing the different ways this exception has been formulated, and the
considerable differences in results reached from case to case and circuit to circuit);
see also Tillotson v. Boughner, 350 F.2d 663, 664–66 (7th Cir. 1965) (reversing contempt for an attorney refusing to disclose the identity of a client who had independently determined that he had a tax liability and retained the attorney in question to
deliver a cashier’s check for the amount to the IRS).
348
See RICE, supra note 26, § 6:15, at 89 (describing the Tenth Circuit as questioning this exception and the Second Circuit as first reformulating the exception and
then consistently refusing to find it applicable).
349
See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 680 F.2d at 1026 (district court and court of
appeals found identity of fee-payer privileged, reversed en banc with three out of
seven judges dissenting).
350
See ROTHSTEIN & CRUMP, supra note 336, § 2:11, at 87–99 (summarizing cases
on client identity).
351
See, e.g., Liew v. Breen, 640 F.2d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding attorney’s
fee sanction arising from privilege claim for client identity was not abuse of discretion because legal issue was not sufficiently doubtful to show good faith dispute).
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consequence of making such a frivolous claim is likely to be contempt
for the attorney raising this objection, as attempts to get testimony
from attorneys about undisclosed clients are most often made in the
352
context of grand jury investigations and criminal trials of third par353
ties.
x.

Location or Address of Client

In ordinary cases, clients’ communication of their address is
clearly neither made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice nor
354
meant to be confidential.
In cases where clients do not want to be
found, however, address information communicated to an attorney is
meant to be confidential. In these cases, the factual context of the
communication becomes paramount in determining whether privilege will attach to the location information. Attempts to compel lawyers to disclose the confidentially communicated location or address
of clients most often arise in the context of custody cases in which
355
one parent has disappeared with minor children, criminal cases in
356
which the defendant cannot be found or has skipped bail, and civil
cases in which the location of a client is needed to enforce a mone357
tary judgment.
In the custody cases, the location of the client who has disappeared with minor children has often been found to fall outside of
352
E.g., Ex parte Enzor, 117 So. 2d 361, 362, 365–66 (Ala. 1960) (reversing an order of confinement for an attorney who refused to disclose a client’s identity to a
grand jury because disclosure would reveal the client’s guilt on the very matter for
which the lawyer had been employed to advise).
353
E.g., United States v. Flores, 628 F.2d 521, 527 (9th Cir. 1980) (affirming order
of confinement for civil contempt until attorney testified, matter expired, or eighteen months had been served); Hughes v. Meade, 453 S.W.2d 538, 542 (Ky. 1970)
(civil contempt order for refusing to reveal name of client justified because attorney
hired to help return stolen property to police was not providing legal advice at all).
354
ROTHSTEIN & CRUMP, supra note 336, 85–87 (describing client address information as non-privileged because it related to general features of attorney-client relationship rather than communications for specific advice); accord Viveros v. Nationwide Janitorial Ass’n, 200 F.R.D. 681, 683–84 (N.D. Ga. 2000) (imposing sanctions of
$50 and attorney’s fees where addresses and phone numbers were withheld on
ground of privilege and there was no attempt to show that confidential legal advice
was sought regarding the address).
355
See, e.g., Bersani v. Bersani, 565 A.2d 1368 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1989) (wife disappeared with children); Dike v. Dike, 448 P.2d 490 (Wash. 1968) (wife disappeared
with child).
356
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Maguigan, 511 A.2d 1327 (Pa. 1986) (attorney refused to reveal location of client who skipped bail in a rape case).
357
See Sullivan v. Carrigan, 10 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 431 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (holding attorney in contempt for refusing to reveal the telephone number of client with an outstanding default judgment).
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attorney-client privilege, with some important exceptions. When the
failure to disclose location assists the client in contemptuous violation
of a court order not to leave the jurisdiction and frustrates court rulings based on the best interests of the child, any legal purpose for the
communication is trumped by the use of the attorney to assist in the
criminal or fraudulent conduct of the client, thus bringing the crime358
fraud exception to attorney-client privilege into effect. At the same
time, however, courts have upheld claims that client location information was privileged where harm to the parent or child was feared if
359
the location was revealed, or when it was not clear that the disap360
pearing parent had actually violated a valid court order.
Several decades ago, when this was a novel issue of law, judgments of contempt against lawyers refusing to disclose such information were vacated even as courts clearly held that the information had
361
to be disclosed.
In jurisdictions where these issues have been settled for some time, courts may now be willing to find lawyers in contempt for refusing to disclose the location of disappearing parents in
custody cases involving clear violation of court orders and not involving fear of harm because such claims will be viewed as substantively
frivolous.
y.

Fee or Billing Information

The attorney-client privilege only protects communications
made for the purpose of getting legal advice—it does not protect “all
occurrences and conversations which have any bearing, direct or in362
direct, upon the relationship of the attorney with his client.” These
occurrences and conversations either do not involve communications
358

See Bersani, 565 A.2d at 1371–72 (holding wife in contempt of order not to
leave country); Jacqueline F. v. Segal, 391 N.E.2d 967, 972 (N.Y. 1979) (guardian
moved to Puerto Rico during appeal of custody order); Jafarian-Kerman v. JafarianKerman, 424 S.W.2d 333, 339–40 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967) (finding no privilege when
husband left country with child in violation of temporary custody order because the
obstruction of justice triggered the crime-fraud exception).
359
See, e.g., Taylor v. Taylor, 359 N.E.2d 820, 824 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (wife requested confidentiality of address due to fear for her safety and that of her child);
Waldman v. Waldman, 358 N.E.2d 521, 522 (Ohio 1976) (suggesting that confidentiality of client addresses may be generally necessary in domestic relations matters to
protect client safety).
360
See, e.g., Brennan v. Brennan, 422 A.2d 510, 517 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (finding
no crime or fraud because father had not been served with notice of custody hearing
or custody order).
361
See, e.g., Dike v. Dike, 448 P.2d 490, 499 (Wash. 1968) (relieving the attorney of
the contempt citation because the “application of the privilege [was] rather obscure”).
362
United States v. Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280, 281–82 (6th Cir.).
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from clients, or if they do, are not viewed as confidential communica363
Thus, information
tions for the purpose of seeking legal advice.
364
ordinarily found in bills, such as time expended, the fact of meet365
366
ings or calls, the general nature of work done, fee arrange367
368
ments, including the fact of payment and who paid, and ex369
penses, is not viewed as privileged. If revealing this information has
the effect of revealing a privileged attorney-client communication,
however, such fee or billing information will be viewed as privileged
370
as well. Thus, where a client’s motive for seeking legal services, the
litigation strategy, or the specifics of the legal services sought could
be deduced from particularly detailed bills, they have been treated as
371
Some courts have viewed billing information as priviprivileged.
372
leged where the information would incriminate the client, but
more recently, this has been limited to cases where disclosure of an
373
actual confidential communication would result.
These special circumstances are not likely to be present in cases
374
not involving either unusually detailed bills, criminal wrongdo363

In re Walsh, 623 F.2d 489, 494 (7th Cir. 1980).
Id.
365
Id.
366
ROTHSTEIN & CRUMP, supra note 336, at 85.
367
In re Osterhoudt, 722 F.2d 591, 592 (9th Cir. 1983) (“[G]enerally ‘fee arrangements with . . . clients are not confidential communications protected by attorney-client privilege.’” (quoting United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1353
(9th Cir. 1977))).
368
In re Walsh, 623 F.2d at 494.
369
ROTHSTEIN & CRUMP, supra note 336, at 89.
370
Id. at 92.
371
See Clarke v. Am. Commerce Nat’l Bank, 974 F.2d 127, 129–30 (9th Cir. 1992)
(noting exception, but finding no privilege in this case where “statements contain
information on the identity of the client, the case name for which payment was
made, the amount of the fee, and the general nature of the services performed”).
372
ROTHSTEIN & CRUMP, supra note 336, at 92–94 (although this has been limited
by some courts to situations where the information “provides the last link in a chain
of evidence” against the client).
373
Id. at 97–99; see, e.g., Seventh Elect Church in Israel. v. Rogers, 688 P.2d 506,
510 (Wash. 1984) (holding that a potentially incriminating disclosure regarding fees
was not privileged if it did not “convey the substance of the confidential communications”); In re Osterhoudt, 722 F.2d 591, 592–94 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting that the idea
that mere incrimination would make the fee information privileged, rather than the
privileged nature of the information revealed, was based on a misreading of case
law); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 896 F.2d 1267, 1274–75 (11th Cir. 1990) (explaining that the implicit communication of the fact of having sufficient money to
pay the fee which accompanies payment or a promise to pay a fee is not confidential
and need not be protected to encourage effective legal representation).
374
See, e.g., Real v. Cont’l Group, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 211, 214 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (noting the unusually detailed nature of the billing statements sought to be discovered);
364

STRASSBERGFINAL

488

1/15/2007 11:57:13 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:413

375

ing, or the payment of a fee by the client or a third party in a cir376
Furthermore,
cumstance suggestive of wrongdoing by the client.
the presence of these special circumstances only suggests the possibility that a confidential communication may be revealed with fee in377
Careful attention to the presformation—it does not guarantee it.
ence of special circumstances, legal research, and an analysis of the
basic elements of privilege sufficient to provide a good faith argument that fee or billing records fall within these possible exceptions
will be necessary to prevent claims of attorney-client privilege for such
378
information from being found sanctionable.
d. Frivolous Because Not Made in Confidence
A communication from a client to an attorney must be both intended to be confidential and made in a manner that reasonably
could achieve confidentiality in order to satisfy the confidentiality
379
Information is not intended to be confidential if it is inelement .
380
tended to be transmitted by the attorney to a third party.
Thus, inChaudhry v. Gallerizzo, 174 F.3d 394, 403 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding privilege where
the bills showed the federal statutes researched); Lane v. Sharp Packaging Sys., Inc.,
640 N.W.2d 788, 804–05 (Wis. 2002) (finding billing records that contained detailed
descriptions of the legal service privileged).
375
See generally ROTHSTEIN & CRUMP, supra note 336, at 90–97 & nn.22–24 (collecting and discussing the mostly criminal cases in which claims of privilege were upheld
for information of this kind); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 925 F. Supp. 849, 857 (D.
Mass. 1995) (noting that the payment information, determined to be non-privileged,
was sought regarding the wrongdoing of others rather than the client).
376
See generally ROTHSTEIN & CRUMP, supra note 336, at 92–97 & n.24 (discussing
numerous cases and circumstances in which client incrimination did or did not make
fee information privileged).
377
In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 925 F. Supp. at 855 (noting that fee information is
privileged only in “rare situations”).
378
See, e.g., R.A. Hanson Co. v. Magnuson, 903 P.2d 496, 499–500 (Wash. Ct. App.
1995) (affirming a contempt order against an attorney who refused, on grounds of
privilege, to disclose information about the attorney’s payment on behalf of the client of legal fees for a third party in another case); Moudy v. Superior Court, 964 P.2d
469, 472 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998) (affirming a finding of contempt for an attorney who
refused, on grounds of attorney-client privilege, to reveal whether a client had been
told of a trial date and whether the client had had contact with other public defender staff); State v. Keenan, 771 P.2d 244, 248 (Or. 1989) (upholding a contempt
finding for refusal to disclose dates of attorney-client contacts where the substance of
the communications would not thereby be revealed). But see Seventh Elect Church,
688 P.2d at 512 (vacating a finding of contempt against lawyers who refused “in good
faith” to disclose unprivileged legal fee information in a case that appeared to make
new law in Washington, as no Washington precedents were cited in the court’s attorney-client privilege analysis).
379
RICE, supra note 26, § 6:1, at 7–9 (confidentiality requires both subjective and
objective intent).
380
EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 178.
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formation provided to an attorney for the purpose of preparing a tax
return, for incorporation in a letter to a third party, a prospectus or
other filing, or for any other form of disclosure will not be viewed as a
381
Communications made in public
confidential communication.
382
places with no attempt to avoid being overheard or deliberately
made in the presence of third parties who cannot be shown to be a
383
384
client-spouse, the agent of the client or the attorney, or otherwise
385
will not be viewed as made
necessary to provision of legal services,
in confidence. Of course, determinations as to what the client intended to have transmitted to others, who is an agent of a client or
attorney, who is necessary to the provision of legal services, or what
constitutes reasonable attempts to ensure or maintain confidentiality
of communications will be highly fact dependent. As long as sufficient facts are present to allow a good faith argument on these points,
a claim of privilege will not be frivolous or unethical.
Although clients with a common interest, such as joint clients,
who communicate with their attorney in each other’s presence, technically do so in the presence of a third party, such communications
are nonetheless viewed as made in confidence as to real third par386
ties. The presence of a common interest is crucial to the finding of
privilege in these cases, and can arise in a number of factual situations, including patent cases, joint ventures, and common criminal or
387
A claim of privilege under the common interest doccivil defense.
trine will not be frivolous as long as a good faith basis in fact and law
exists for claiming a common interest. Such communications, however, are not viewed as made in confidence vis-à-vis the joint clients

381
Id. at 172–76, 178–82 (summarizing cases where no intention of confidentiality
was found due to expectation of transmittal to third parties). But see RICE, supra note
26, § 6:8, at 54 (suggesting that the conclusion of no intent for confidentiality should
not be inferred from intent to have the lawyer transmit the information subsequently, as legal services may counsel against the transmission).
382
ROTHSTEIN & CRUMP, supra note 336, §2:16, at 107–08 (reasonable attempts to
avoid ordinary eavesdropping or observation must be made).
383
EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 168 (noting that the presence of other relatives or
non-marital partners will destroy confidentiality). But see Schreiber v. Kellogg, No.
90-5806, 1992 WL 309632, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 19, 1992) (presence of the father of
the client at meeting between the client and his attorney does not the defeat attorney-client privilege).
384
ROTHSTEIN & CRUMP, supra note 336, § 2:16, at 111.
385
Id. at 115–16; see also Tausz v. Clarion-Goldfield Cmty. Sch. Dist., 569 N.W.2d
125, (Iowa 1997) (holding that the presence of an accountant was essential to rendering a legal opinion).
386
EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 196.
387
Id. at 196–213; see also ROTHSTEIN & CRUMP, supra note 336, § 2:17, at 117–21.
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388

themselves.
As a result, the attorney-client privilege cannot be asserted by one joint client to prevent a disclosure of communications
389
to the joint attorney desired by the other client.
e.

Frivolous Because Not Made by the Client

Attorney-client privilege will only attach to communications
390
It is the claimant’s
made by the client or an agent of the client.
391
burden to show that there is an attorney-client relationship.
Various legal tests are used to assess whether communications by an agent
are involved, depending on whether the client is an individual or an
392
entity with many internal corporate agents, and whether the agent
393
These tests
is an independent contractor, assistant or consultant.
are highly fact dependent, thus it may be that many claims of agency
are at least colorable and therefore non-frivolous. However, the absence of facts making the agency relationship colorable will make a
claim of privilege arising from a third party communication frivolous
394
and unethical.
f.

Frivolous Because Privilege Has Been Waived

The party claiming privilege also bears the burden of showing
395
that the privilege has not been waived.
Thus, a claim of privilege
388

EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 213.
See Athridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 184 F.R.D. 200, 204 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding a communication from insurance company to insured’s lawyer not privileged
against insured where lawyer was viewed as representing the common interest of the
insured and the insurance company).
390
RICE, supra note 26, § 4:1, at 9–10.
391
Id. at 8–9 (noting that prospective clients are clients for this purpose and that
the burden is on the claimant to show the relationship).
392
E.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 390 (1981) (setting out the
federal test of privilege for communications from corporate employees to corporate
attorneys).
393
RICE, supra note 26, § 4:2, at 12–21 (discussing the “necessity” test used to determine the agent status of non-employees).
394
Waldman v. Waldman, 358 N.E.2d 521, 523 (upholding contempt charge
against an attorney claiming privilege for address of the son of a client because the
attorney failed to provide any evidence showing that he learned the address from his
client); Ost-West-Handel Bruno Bischoff GmbH, v. M/V Pride of Donegal, No. M885, 1997 WL 231126, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 1997) (granting sanctions where numerous documents that were “not communications with any client” were withheld and
no privilege log was provided).
395
See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dean, 813 F. Supp. 1426, 1428 (D. Ariz. 1993)
(testimony concerning the precautions taken to maintain the confidentiality of a
memo quoted in a newspaper article was sufficient to meet the burden of showing
non-waiver); Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 863 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (claimant of privilege bears the burden of showing that confidentiality, a “fun389

STRASSBERGFINAL

2007]

1/15/2007 11:57:13 AM

PRIVILEGE CAN BE ABUSED

491

may be substantively frivolous if made for communications that would
be privileged but for a clearly present subsequent waiver. However,
while some waivers involve fairly simple legal rules and factual deter396
397
minations, other waivers are either controversial, rest on unset398
399
Indeed, even where a
tled law, or are highly fact dependent.
damental prerequisite to assertion of the privilege,” was maintained after the communication was made).
396
See ROTHSTEIN & CRUMP, supra note 336, at 159–60 (describing “express waiver,
failure to assert the privilege, or voluntary disclosure” as “relatively unproblematic
concepts”); see also In re Omeprazole Patent Litigation, 227 F.R.D. 227, 231–32
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (disclosing information to an expert witness constitutes a voluntary
waiver of privilege and the “specious and frivolous” motion to protect the disclosed
information justified an award of attorney’s fees from counsel and client jointly and
severally); EEOC v. Exel, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1181 (E.D. Mo. 2002) (granting
fees and costs sanctions where client voluntarily answered early deposition questions
about communications with his attorney, then claimed privilege as to later questions).
397
The issue of whether voluntary disclosure of privileged information to a government agency results in waiver of privilege in all future settings, sometimes described as selective waiver, has produced three different approaches in the federal
courts. See EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE & THE WORKPRODUCT DOCTRINE 76–85 (4th ed. Supp. 2004) (collecting cases in which courts in
the Federal, First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth circuits held that selective waiver is a total waiver; in which courts in the Second, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and
Tenth Circuits held that selective waiver was not a waiver in other settings; and in
which courts in the First, Second, and Seventh Circuits have held or suggested that
selective waiver would not waive privilege if an agreement or protective order to that
effect was put in place at the time of the selective waiver). The encroachment on attorney-client privilege created by the combination of the no-selective-waiver approach and the expanding coercive practice of government agencies to demand
privileged information in exchange for “cooperation credit” in criminal and regulatory investigations recently triggered the formation of an American Bar Association
Task Force on Attorney-Client Privilege. See TASK FORCE REPORT ON ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE, supra note 19, at 1, 12–21.
398
EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 309–16 (collecting cases illustrating the three different approaches to inadvertent disclosure waiver: usually waived; usually not waived;
and waiver dependant on five-factor analysis of the circumstances of the disclosure).
It should be noted that within particular jurisdictions, the approach taken to inadvertent disclosures may have reached the status of settled law; however, a frivolous claim
would only appear possible in jurisdictions following the most harsh approach, as the
possibility of maintaining privilege despite an inadvertent disclosure is either quite
likely in the “usually-not-waived” jurisdictions or is arguable on the facts in the “fivefactor-analysis” jurisdictions).
399
See ROTHSTEIN & CRUMP, supra note 336, 147–50 & nn.2, 4–8 (collecting cases
finding authorization of non-officer corporate employee waivers even though this
authority “is normally exercised by its officers and directors;” cases finding a lack of
authorization of corporate officer waivers; cases finding attorney waivers both authorized and unauthorized by clients; and cases finding trustee waivers for individual
bankrupts always authorized, never authorized, and sometimes authorized). Waivers
made by corporate officers, employees, and client representatives, such as attorneys,
are dependent on a determination that the waiving actor had authority to make the
waiver, which is a very fact-dependent determination. Id.
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waiver as to a specific communication is unarguable, the extent to
which the implied waiver extends to other privileged communications on the same subject is a determination subject to both varying
400
In these more problegal tests and the specific facts of the case.
lematic areas of waiver, assertions of non-waiver are likely to be
viewed as colorable and non-frivolous. The existence of a waiver,
however, has been viewed as sufficiently non-controversial to justify
sanctions in cases where counsel expressly stated that privilege was
401
waived as to a particular subject or where advice of counsel was
402
403
made an issue in this or previous litigation.
The preceding consideration of the case law involving unsuccessful claims of privilege reveals that specific guidance can be provided concerning the danger of substantively frivolous claims in certain areas of attorney-client privilege in which the law is relatively
straightforward and settled. Other kinds of claims remain either controversial or too fact dependent to allow for useful generalizations.
We also saw that while courts have imposed sanctions on attorneys
who made such substantively frivolous claims, they have also been
sympathetic to lawyers who they have seen as genuinely struggling
with the intersection between ethical duties of confidentiality and legal duties of disclosure, and have vacated sanctions imposed by lower
404
However, as these issues are increasingly brought to, and
courts.
clearly resolved by, state supreme courts and federal appellate courts,
it will become more difficult for attorneys to be seen as making claims
of privilege in good faith unless they both acknowledge the existence

400

See id. at 159, 183–85 (noting that the extent of an implied waiver as to the
same subject matter as the communication expressly, voluntarily, or involuntarily
waived is interpreted more broadly by some courts and less broadly by others).
401
McCormick-Morgan, Inc. v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 134 F.R.D. 275, 284–85
(N.D. Cal. 1991) (imposing monetary sanctions upon attorneys who instructed witnesses not to answer deposition questions on matters squarely within an express
waiver provided by them).
402
See, e.g., Gov’t Guar. Fund of Finland v. Hyatt Corp., 177 F.R.D. 336, 343 (D.V.I.
1997) (imposing sanctions where an attorney in a litigation waived privilege previously established by providing information regarding his advice in opposition to motion for summary judgment).
403
See, e.g., Amway Corp. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., No. 1:98-CV-726, 2001 WL
1818698 at *3, 12 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 3, 2001) (magistrate recommended establishment of a negative fact as a sanction for meritless claims of privilege that included,
among other claims, documents for which privilege had previously been found
waived because they were “at issue” in a prior case).
404
See, e.g., In re Original Grand Jury Investigation, 733 N.E.2d 1135, 1139–40
(Ohio 2000) (vacating contempt and monetary sanctions for an attorney who refused
to turn a letter over to a grand jury on the ground that there was a good faith argument that ethical obligations prohibited the disclosure).
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of the contrary controlling case law and make non-frivolous arguments for distinction or reversal. Increasingly, the comments to the
Model Rules have offered concrete examples of problematic fact patterns to illustrate rules and identify especially common areas of viola405
Including concrete examples of claims of privilege that are
tion.
generally agreed to be legally unsupportable in a comment to Model
Rule 3.1 would be a particularly effective way to help lawyers avoid
these most obviously frivolous claims of attorney-client privilege.
However, this aspect of the proposed comment is likely to be the
most controversial, as it raises concerns that lawyers will be chilled
from carefully considering the possibility that communications described as “frivolous” privilege claims might have merit in unusual
fact settings or legal contexts, or they might be misled by concise, but
406
overbroad characterizations of frivolous claims.
CONCLUSION AND PROPOSED COMMENT
In a society with a complex legal system and laws unintelligible
to non-experts, the attorney-client privilege is essential to the possibility of vindicating rights and maintaining liberties. It is not the intention of this Article to suggest that the law of attorney-client privilege is
too expansive or that the ethical duty to assert the attorney-client
privilege should be reined in. Rather, this Article seeks to strengthen
the privilege against attacks by the executive, the legislature, or even
the judiciary, by ensuring that claims of privilege are seen as a legitimate part of legal representation and not as a mere tool for abuse of
the system. This requires lawyers to exercise the same judgment and
minimal self-restraint as required by other areas of the law to avoid
making frivolous claims. With privilege comes responsibility. The
following proposed comment to Model Rule 3.1 attempts to articulate the attorney’s responsibility. It has four sections that move from
a general explanation of the ethical problem (Part A), to general
rules for avoiding claims that are made in a frivolous manner or are
substantively frivolous (Parts B and C), and finally to more specific
examples of substantively frivolous claims of attorney-client privilege
(Part D). It could be adopted either in whole or in part. Even if all
405
See, e.g., MODEL RULE PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 6–11, 16, 23, 27, 28, 31, 35
(2004) (alerting lawyers to particular fact patterns which often produce conflicts of
interest).
406
Professor Gregory Sisk has expressed to me the concern that while a carefully
nuanced discussion of substantively frivolous claims can do a good job of setting red
or yellow flags for certain kinds of communications without chilling potentially viable
claims of privilege, nuance is lost in a summary comment. Unthinking reliance on
such a comment could then deter non-frivolous claims of privilege.
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four sections were to be adopted, however, it is insufficient on its
own. Legal education and continuing legal education must also take
seriously the importance of developing competence and judgment in
the law of attorney-client privilege.
PROPOSED COMMENT TO MODEL RULE 3.1
A.
The ethical duty of confidentiality requires lawyers to assert
all non-frivolous claims of attorney-client privilege. At the same
time, frivolous claims of attorney-client privilege undermine the
proper function of the adversary system. Lawyers must be aware
that it is also unethical to make a frivolous claim of attorney-client
privilege. The evidentiary burden is on the claiming party to
show the evidence sought falls within the attorney-client privilege.
Ethics requires that lawyers avoid claims of attorney-client privilege that are substantively frivolous or are made in a frivolous
manner.
B.

A claim is made in a frivolous manner if it is made:
(1) without factual investigation, as appropriate under the
circumstances, sufficient to show that facts supporting the
basic legal elements of privilege are present;
(2) made without taking all necessary steps, including legal
research, to ensure that the lawyer has the foundational and
specialized legal knowledge of the law of attorney-client
privilege relevant to this specific claim of privilege;
(3) without engaging in a competent legal analysis applying
the law of privilege relevant to this claim to the facts discovered by the required factual investigation; and
(4) made in violation of a court rule or order requiring the
provision of specific facts relevant to privilege or a demonstration that the legal elements of privilege are met by these
facts.

C. A claim of privilege will be substantively frivolous if it is
made:
(1) with essential facts missing;
(2) based on ignorance or misreading of the law of privilege;
(3) while failing to acknowledge and appropriately distinguish controlling adverse authority; and
(4) based on a change or reversal of existing law without
providing argument and support for such a change.
D. It is especially important for lawyers to engage in the appropriate fact investigation and legal research described above when
considering the privilege status of communications for which a
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colorable claim of privilege can be particularly difficult to establish, such as:
(1) communications that seek non-legal advice or seek no
legal advice, as is the case with scheduling communications,
transmittal letters, and some documents sent by clients both
to lawyers and non-lawyer employees of the client;
(2) non-communications, such as objects, ordinary observations, and underlying information;
(3) specific communications viewed as not ordinarily made
by the client for the purpose of getting legal advice, such as
ordinary client identity or location information;
(4) communications not made in confidence, such as communications made to a lawyer and third parties, made in the
presence of third parties, or intended to be disclosed to
third parties;
(5) communications to the lawyer not made by the client; or
(6) where privilege as to these communications has been
expressly waived by counsel or where advice of counsel has
been put at issue.
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